For this entry, we
recall the heavyweight jurist retired Associate Justice Isagani Cruz by briefly
revisiting his stirring dissents in the Checkpoint Case (Valmonte vs. De Villa, G.R. No. 83988,
September 29, 1989, which was later reiterated and
amplified in People vs. Exala, G.R. No.
76005, April 23, 1993) and the Caucasian Drug Trafficking
Case (People vs. Malmstedt, G.R. No. 91107
June 19, 1991).
Justice Cruz was
appointed to the Supreme Court of the Philippines by then-President Corazon
Aquino on April 16, 1986. He served the
Court until his retirement on October 11, 1994 when he reached the
mandatory retirement age of 70. During his tenure, he was steadfast in his
defense of individual liberty, many times finding himself on the side of the
minority, if not by his lonesome, in contentious cases.
Our honest and
straightforward assessment is that none of the current crop of magistrates in
the Philippine High Tribunal can approximate the tenacity of the libertarian
advocacy of Justice Cruz. For this, we sorely miss him.
Valmonte vs. De Villa: The checkpoint
controversy
In Valmonte,
petitioners Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, who is a resident of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, and the Union of Lawyers and Advocates For People’s Rights (ULAP)
sought the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and
elsewhere as unconstitutional. In the alternative, they prayed that respondents
Renato De Villa and the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) be
directed to formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints for the
protection of the people.
Petitioners contended
that the checkpoints gave the respondents blanket authority to make searches
and seizures without search warrant or court order in violation of the
Constitution. The Court en banc however voted 13-2 to DISMISS the petition.
Justice Padilla – with whom Chief Justice Fernan
and Associate Justices Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Paras, Feliciano,
Gancayno, Bidin, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado concurred – wrote
the ponencia, reasoning among
others as follows:
The setting up of the
questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be
considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of
establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for
the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to
thwart plots to destabilize the government, in the interest of public security.
In this connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban
centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in
the increased killings in cities of police and military men by NPA “sparrow
units,” not to mention the abundance of unlicensed firearms and the alarming
rise in lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not all of which are
reported in media, most likely brought about by deteriorating economic
conditions – which all sum up to what one can rightly consider, at the very
least, as abnormal times. Between the inherent right of the state to protect
its existence and promote public welfare and an individual’s right against a
warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted, the
former should prevail.
True, the manning of
checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in the
same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the
cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the
citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted within
reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a
peaceful community.
The majority ruling
did not sit well with Justice Cruz. True to his libertarian judicial
philosophy, he wrote a scathing dissent (Justice Sarmiento was the only
other magistrate who joined Justice Cruz and wrote his own separate dissenting opinion), thus:
I dissent. The
sweeping statements in the majority opinion are as dangerous as the checkpoints
it would sustain and fraught with serious threats to individual liberty. The
bland declaration that individual rights must yield to the demands of national
security ignores the fact that the Bill of Rights was intended precisely to
limit the authority of the State even if asserted on the ground of national
security. What is worse is that the searches and seizures are peremptorily
pronounced to be reasonable even without proof of probable cause and much less
the required warrant. The improbable excuse is that they are aimed at
“establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order,
and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political
development of the National Capital Region.” For these purposes, every
individual may be stopped and searched at random and at any time simply because
he excites the suspicion, caprice, hostility or malice of the officers manning
the checkpoints, on pain of arrest or worse, even being shot to death, if he
resists.
I have no quarrel
with a policeman flashing a light inside a parked vehicle on a dark street as a
routine measure of security and curiosity. But the case at bar is different.
Military officers are systematically stationed at strategic checkpoint to
actively ferret out suspected criminals by detaining and searching any
individual who in their opinion might impair “the social, economic and
political development of the National Capital Region.” It is incredible that we
can sustain such a measure. And we are not even under martial law.
Unless we are
vigilant of our rights, we may find ourselves back to the dark era of the
truncheon and the barbed wire, with the Court itself a captive of its own
complaisance and sitting at the death-bed of liberty.
People vs. Exala:
More Justice Cruz on checkpoints
The Valmonte ruling
on the validity of stop-and-search in police or military checkpoints was cited
as a justification for sustaining the conviction of the accused in People vs. Exala, G.R. No.
76005, April 23, 1993. In this case, the accused were
convicted of illegal transport of marijuana after they were apprehended in a
checkpoint with a bag found to contain marijuana. The 1st Division
of the Court, speaking through Justice Bellosillo (with Justices Griño-Aquino and Quiason concurring)
sustained the legality of the admission of the marijuana as
evidence, holding that “[t]here are indeed instances where search and
seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest. An
illustration would be the “stop-and-search” without a warrant at military or
police checkpoints, the constitutionality of which has already been upheld by
this Court [in Valmonte vs. De Villa].”
Justice Cruz, this
time by his lonesome, again dissented. Aside from the reasons expressed in his
dissent in Valmonte (and in the case of People
vs. Malmstedt), he argued in his dissenting opinion as follows:
I am opposed to
checkpoints as regular police measures aimed at reducing criminality in
general. I do not agree that in the interest of peace and order, any or every
vehicle may be stopped at any time by the authorities and searched without
warrant on the chance that it may be carrying prohibited articles. That
possibility is not the probable cause envisioned in the Bill of Rights.
In the case of the
ordinary checkpoint, there is not even any suspicion to justify the search. The
search is made as a matter of course, either of all vehicles or at random.
There is no showing that a crime is about to be committed, is actually being
committed, or has just been committed and the searching officer has personal
knowledge that the person being searched or arrested is the culprit.
I will concede that
checkpoints may be established at borders of states or at ‘constructive
borders’ near the boundary for the purpose of preventing violations of
immigration and customs laws. But in the interior of the territory, the requirements
of a valid search and seizure must be strictly observed. The only permissible
exemption is where a crime like a bank robbery has just been committed or a
jailbreak has just occurred, and the authorities have to seal off all possible
avenues of escape in the area. In all other cases, I submit that the checkpoint
should not be allowed.
xxx. [W]e cannot
retroactively validate an illegal search on the justification that, after all,
the articles seized are illegal. That is putting the cart before the horse. I
would rather see some criminals go unpunished now and then than agree to the
Bill of Rights being systematically ignored in the oppressive checkpoint.
Respect for the Constitution is more important than securing a conviction based
on a violation of the rights of the accused.
People vs. Malmstedt: Retroactive
validation of an otherwise illegal search
Finally, we look into People vs. Malmstedt, G.R. No.
91107, June 19, 1991. In this case, NARCOM agents set up
a check point at around 10:00 A.M. on May 11, 1989 as a consequence of
persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were
transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs, and after receiving
information at around 8:00 A.M. earlier of that same day that a Caucasian
coming from Sagada had in his possession some prohibited drugs. Later at about
1:30 P.M., the bus where accused was riding was stopped at the check point. Two
NARCOM agents boarded the bus, announced who they were and their purpose, and
proceeded with their routine inspection from the front going towards the rear
of the bus where the accused, who was the sole foreigner therein, was seated.
Upon noticing a bulge on accused’s waist, which they suspected to be a gun, one
of the officers asked for his passport and other identification papers. When
accused failed to comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was
that was bulging on his waist. It turned out to be a pouch bag, which, when
opened by the accused as ordered, contained four suspicious-looking objects
wrapped in brown packing tape. This prompted the officer to open one of the
wrapped objects, which turned out to contain hashish, a derivative of
marijuana. Malmstedt was thus prosecuted for and convicted of illegally
transporting the prohibited drug.
When Malmstedt
appealed, the Supreme Court en banc voted 9-5 (Justice Sarmiento was then on
leave) to SUSTAIN the warrantless search and the use as evidence of the items
seized as a consequence thereof. Just like the Checkpoint case, Justice Padilla
– with whom Justices Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Griño-Aquino,
Medialdea, Regalado and Davide concur – again wrote the majority opinion and declared as
follows:
While it is true that the NARCOM
officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search was made over the
personal effects of accused, however, under the circumstances of the case,
there was sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that accused
was then and there committing a crime.
xxx xxx xxx
The receipt of
information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs
in his possession, plus the suspicious failure of the accused to produce his
passport, taken together as a whole, led the NARCOM officers to reasonably
believe that the accused was trying to hide something illegal from the
authorities. From these circumstances arose a probable cause which
justified the warrantless search that was made on the personal effects of the
accused. In other words, the acts of the NARCOM officers in requiring the
accused to open his pouch bag and in opening one of the wrapped objects found
inside said bag (which was discovered to contain hashish) as well as the two
(2) travelling bags containing two (2) teddy bears with hashish stuffed inside
them, were prompted by accused's own attempt to hide his identity by refusing
to present his passport, and by the information received by the NARCOM that a
Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession. To deprive
the NARCOM agents of the ability and facility to act accordingly, including to
search even without warrant, in the light of such circumstances, would be to
sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the detriment of
society.
xxx. The unfortunate
fact is that although the existence of the hashish is an objective physical
reality that cannot but be conceded, there is in law no evidence to demonstrate
with any degree of persuasion, much less beyond reasonable doubt, that Malmstedt
was engaged in a criminal activity. This is the paradox created by the
disregard of the applicable constitutional safeguards. The tangible benefit is
that the hashish in question has been correctly confiscated and thus
effectively withdrawn from private use.
What is here said
should not by any means be taken as a disapproval or a disparagement of the
efforts of the police and military authorities to deter and detect offenses,
whether they be possession of and traffic in prohibited drugs, or some other. Those
efforts obviously merit the support and commendation of the Courts and indeed
of every responsible citizen. But those efforts must take account of the basic
rights granted by the Constitution and the law to persons who may fall under
suspicion of engaging in criminal acts. Disregard of those rights may not be
justified by the objective of ferreting out and punishing crime, no matter how
eminently desirable attainment of that objective might be. Disregard of those
rights, as this Court has earlier stressed, may result in the escape of the
guilty, and all because the “constable has blundered,” rendering the evidence
inadmissible even if truthful or otherwise credible.
Justice Cruz joined
Justice Narvasa’s opinion, reasoning that the latter’s disquisition represents the correct application to the facts of the
case of the provisions of the Bill of Rights and the Rules of Court on searches
and seizures. Justice Cruz then expounded on his arguments in his separate dissent, viz.:
I write this separate
opinion merely to remark on an observation made during the deliberation on this
case that some members of the Court seem to be coddling criminals instead of
extending its protection to society, which deserves our higher concern. The inference
is that because of our wrong priorities, criminals are being imprudently let
free, to violate our laws again; and it is all our fault.
Believing myself to
be among those alluded to, I will say without apology that I do not consider a
person a criminal, until he is convicted by final judgment after a fair trial
by a competent and impartial court. Until then, the Constitution bids us to
presume him innocent. He may seem boorish or speak crudely or sport tattoos or
dress weirdly or otherwise fall short of our own standards of propriety and
decorum. None of these makes him a criminal although he may look like
a criminal.
xxx xxx xxx
On the question
before us, it seems to be the inclination of some judges to wink at an illegal
search and seizure as long as the suspect has been actually found in possession
of a prohibited article. That fact will retroactively validate the violation of
the Bill of Rights for after all, as they would rationalize, the suspect is a
criminal. What matters to them is the fact of illegal possession, not the fact
of illegal search and seizure.
xxx xxx xxx
The fruit of the
poisonous tree should not be allowed to poison our system of criminal justice.
In the case at bar, the search was made at a checkpoint established for the
preposterous reason that the route was being used by marijuana dealers and on
an individual who had something bulging at his waist that excited the soldier's
suspicion. Was that probable cause? The ponencia notes that
the military had advance information that a Caucasian was coming from the
Sagada with prohibited drugs in his possession. This is what the military says
now, after the fact, to justify the warrantless search. It is
so easy to make such a claim, and I am surprised that the majority should
readily accept it.
xxx xxx xxx
The conclusion that
there was probable cause [to effect the warrantless arrest] may have been
influenced by the subsequent discovery that the accused was carrying a
prohibited drug. This is supposed to justify the soldier's suspicion. In other
words, it was the fact of illegal possession that retroactively established
the probable cause that validated the illegal search and seizure. It was the
fruit of the poisonous tree that washed clean the tree itself.
Justice Cruz then
delivered the clincher to his opinion with his characteristic magnificent
prose: “If by deterring the government from playing ‘an ignoble
part,’ I am ‘coddling criminals,’ I welcome the accusation and take pride in
it. I would rather err in favor of the accused who is impaled with outlawed
evidence than exalt order at the price of liberty.”
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