Results of the 2011 Bar Examinations Out This Week

ABS-CBNnews.com reports today that the results of the 2011 Bar examinations will be released this Wednesday, February 29, 2012.

Last week, there were reports (rumours) that the result will be out last Tuesday after the Supreme Court en banc session, but that turned out to be a dud for many examinees and their friends and loved ones who are eagerly anticipating the release of the results.

Amendment of 4 Separate Informations of Illegal Recruitment Into 1 Information for the "Non-Bailable" Crime of Large Scale Illegal Recruitment : Fronda-Baggao vs. People, G.R. No. 151785, December 10, 2007

D E C I S I O N

(1^st Division)

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

I.      THE FACTS

Four (4) separate Informations for [simple] illegal recruitment were filed against petitioner Susan Fronda-Baggao. Before arraignment, and while the accused was already out on bail, the prosecutor moved to amend the Informations, praying that the 4 separate Informations be amended so that there would only be one Information for illegal recruitment in large scale. The trial court granted the motion. The CA affirmed the trial court’s order granting the motion.

People vs. Yabut, G.R. Nos. 115719-26, October 5, 1999 : Acquittal of Estafa not Bar to Conviction of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale

D E C I S I O N

(2^nd Division)

QUISUMBING, J.:

I.      THE FACTS:

Appellant Yabut was charged with 8 counts of estafa and illegal recruitment in large scale. The trial court acquitted him of the 8 counts of estafa but convicted him of illegal recruitment in large scale. He appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court.

Eligibility for Probation Even After Appealing From an Erroneous Judgment : The Colinares vs. People (G.R. No. 182748, December 13, 2011) Doctrine

D E C I S I O N

ABAD, J.:

I.      THE FACTS

Accused-appellant Arnel Colinares (Arnel) was charged with frustrated homicide for hitting the head of the private complainant with a piece of stone. He alleged self-defense but the trial court found him guilty of the crime charged and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment from 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum.  Since the maximum probationable imprisonment under the law was only up to 6 years, Arnel did not qualify for probation.

Arnel appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), invoking self-defense and, alternatively, seeking conviction for the lesser crime of attempted homicide with the consequent reduction of the penalty imposed on him.  His conviction was affirmed by the CA. Hence, this appeal to the Supreme Court.

Grosjean vs. American Press Co., Inc., 297 U.S. 233, February 10, 1936 Grosjean vs. American Press Co., Inc. 297 U.S. 233, February 10, 1936

The case of Grosjean vs. American Press Co., Inc., 297 U.S. 233, February 10, 1936, involved a Louisiana law that imposed on publishing companies a license tax of 2% of the gross receipts for the privilege of engaging in advertising in newspapers, magazines or periodicals if their circulation is more than 20,000 copies per week. Nine Louisiana-based publishers of newspapers, with circulations of more than 20,000 copies per week each, filed a suit to enjoin the enforcement against them of the said provision. They assailed the validity of the act on the ground, inter alia, that it abridges the freedom of the press in contravention of the due process clause contained in the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.

Abrams vs. U.S., 250 U.S. 616, November 10, 1919

In Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, November 10, 1919, Russian immigrants in the United States (U.S.) were charged of conspiring to violate the U.S. Espionage Act by publishing leaflets critical of the U.S. government at a time when the U.S. was at war with Germany. Specifically, they were charged with, among others, inciting resistance to the U.S. war effort and urging curtailment of production of essential war materials (i.e. ordnance and ammunition) through their leaflets. 

New York Times vs. United States, 403 U.S. 713, June 30, 1971

In New York Times vs. U.S., 403 U.S. 713, June 30, 1971, the federal government of the U.S. sought to enjoin the New York Times and the Washington Post from publishing the contents of a classified Pentagon paper entitled “History of U.S. Decision-Making Process on Viet Nam Policy.” In a terse per curiam resolution, the U.S. Supreme Court declared that “‘[a]ny system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.’ The Government ‘thus carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of such a [prior] restraint.’ The Court held that in this particular case the Government had not met that burden. Thus, it lifted the injunction it preliminarily issued previously against the newspapers. 

The Power of the MTRCB to Review and Classify Religious TV Programs : The Mendoza thesis

Among the various opinions filed in Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119673, July 26, 1996, the  separate opinion of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza seems to me to be the most plausible. Because of that, I am posting a summary of his opinion apart from the rest of the opinions that I previously posted jointly.

Essentially, the Mendoza thesis says that “[c]ensorship may be allowed only in a narrow class of cases involving pornography, excessive violence, and danger to national security. Even in these cases, only courts can prohibit the showing of a film or the broadcast of a program. In all other cases, the only remedy against speech which creates a clear and present danger to public interests is through subsequent punishment. Considering the potentiality for harm which motion pictures and TV programs may have especially on the young, all materials may validly be required to be submitted for review before they may be shown or broadcast. However, the final determination of the character of the materials cannot be left to an administrative agency. That judicial review of administrative action is available does not obviate the constitutional objection to censorship.” 

Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Court of Appeals : The Power of the State to Review and Classify (Censor) Religious Television Shows

In Iglesia ni Cristo vs. CA, G.R. No. 119673, July 26, 1996, several pre-taped episodes of the TV program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo” of the religious group Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) were rated “X” – i.e., not for public viewing – by the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television (now Movie and Television Review and Classification Board). These TV programs allegedly “offend[ed] and constitute[d] an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law” because of petitioner INC’s controversial biblical interpretations and its “attacks” against contrary religious beliefs. 

Petitioner INC went to court to question the actions of respondent Board. The RTC ordered the respondent Board to grant petitioner INC the necessary permit for its TV programs. But on appeal by the respondent Board, the CA reversed the RTC. The CA ruled that: (1) the respondent Board has jurisdiction and power to review the TV program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo,” and (2) the respondent Board did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it denied permit for the exhibition on TV of the three series of “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo” on the ground that the materials constitute an attack against another religion. The CA also found the subject TV series “indecent, contrary to law and contrary to good customs.”

The Supreme Court TRO Against the Senate Impeachment Court

In Philippine Savings Bank vs. Senate Impeachment Court, G.R. No. 200238, Philippine Savings Bank (PS Bank) and its President, Pascual M. Garcia III, filed before the Supreme Court an original civil action for certiorari and prohibition with application for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. The TRO was sought to stop the Senate, sitting as impeachment court, from further implementing the Subpoena Ad Testificandum et Duces Tecum, dated February 6, 2012, that it issued against the Branch Manager of PS Bank, Katipunan Branch.

On February 9, 2012, the Court, voting 8-5-2, issued a TRO enjoining the impeachment court from further implementing the subpoena with respect to the foreign currency denominated accounts of CJ Corona. Those who voted for the issuance of the TRO are Justices De Castro, Brion, Bersamin, Abad, Villarama, Perez, Mendoza and Reyes. Dissenting were Justices Carpio, Peralta, Del Castillo, Sereno and Bernabe. Chief Justice Corona and Justice Velasco inhibited.

Judicial Determination of Probable Cause for the Purpose of Issuing a Warrant of Arrest : Is There a Need for the Complete Records of the Case to Have Already Been Forwarded to the Trial Court?

Still in connection with Search and Seizure, I am sharing here the ruling of the High Tribunal in the case of Roberts vs. CA, G.R. No. 113930, March 5, 1996. We look into the ponencia first, then the dissent of Justice Puno.

Search Warrants : Examination Under Oath or Affirmation of the Applicant and His Witnesses

Today, I am sharing my notes on one of the requisites of a valid search warrant: examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and his witnesses. I compiled most of these notes in the course of my preparation for my Constitutional Law 2 class. I enriched them after a family friend’s dwelling house was searched by agents of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) by virtue of a search warrant issued by an RTC judge from another local government unit. (But that is another story better left for another entry.)

The constitutional and legal basis for the requirement

Sec. 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.”

Search Warrants : Use of the Phrase “Used or Intended to be Used [For the Alleged Crime]” Not Per Se Determinative of the Question of Particularity of Description

In Columbia Pictures vs. Flores, G.R. No. 78631, June 29, 1993, paragraph (c) of the subject search warrant authorized the search and seizure of “[t]elevision sets, video cassette recorders, rewinders, tape head cleaners, accessories, equipment and other machines and paraphernalia or materials used or intended to be used in the unlawful sale, lease, distribution, or possession for purpose of sale, lease, distribution, circulation or public exhibition of the above-mentioned pirated video tapes which they are keeping and concealing in the premises above-described . . .”

Mandatory Random Drug Testing Policy in the Workplace : A Valid Form of Invasion to the Right to Privacy

I am about to wrap up my discussions on Search and Seizure in my Constitutional Law 2 class at the University of Cebu College of Law this week. I am therefore sharing in this entry my notes on the Supreme Court ruling discussing the issue on the validity of the random drug testing policy in the work place as mandated by RA No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Acts of 2002. 

Terry vs. Ohio : Stop-and-Frisk As a Valid Form of Warrantless Search

For this entry, we look into the landmark U.S. Supreme Court case of Terry vs. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, decided on June 10 1968. In this ruling, penned by the activist Chief Justice Earl Warren, the concept of “stop-and-frisk” as a valid form of warrantless search was first enunciated.