The Propriety of Applying Rabe v. Flores (A.M. No. P-97-1247, May 14, 1997) in Convicting CJ Corona

And so the inevitable came to pass.

The Senate of the Republic of the Philippines, sitting as an impeachment court, voted 20-3 to convict Chief Justice Renato C. Corona (CJ Corona) yesterday, May 29, 2012. The senator-judges only voted once – on Article II of the Articles of Impeachment. Articles III and VII were no longer voted upon since the conviction under Article II already sufficed.

Among the justifications given by some senator-judges who voted for conviction was the per curiam ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Narita Rabe v. Delsa M. Flores, A.M. No. P-97-1247, a unanimous decision promulgated by the Narvasa Court on May 14, 1997.

In this case, the Supreme Court DISMISSED from service respondent Court Interpreter III Delsa M. Flores (respondent Flores) of RTC Branch IV of Panabo, Davao; FORFEITED all of her retirement benefits and accrued leave credits; and BARRED her from re-employment in any government branch or instrumentality, including government-owned or controlled corporations.

Her fault? She was found guilty of dishonesty and failure to disclose her business interest in her Statement of Assets and Liabilities.

Two acts of misconduct

During the closing arguments last Monday, the lead counsel for CJ Corona stated that “there is no parity of facts” between Rabe v. Flores and the case of CJ Corona. Also in line with this thinking were statements made by some armchair commentators that respondent Flores was dismissed simply because of “dishonesty.”

It is true indeed that respondent Flores was found guilty of dishonesty. But the Supreme Court also expressly made a finding that “[a]side from dishonesty . . . respondent [Flores] is also guilty of failure to perform her legal obligation to disclose her business interests.”

There were therefore two acts committed by respondent Flores: dishonesty and failure to disclose her business interests in her SAL[N]. For both of these overt acts, which amounted to misconduct, the penalty was dismissal from service.

Misconduct No. 1: Dishonesty

The High Tribunal found that respondent Flores still collected her salary as Assessment Clerk of the Municipal Assessor’s Office of the Municipality of Panabo, Davao for the period of May 16-31, 1991 (a mere half-month’s salary!) even when she already started working as interpreter of RTC Branch IV on May 16, 1991.

This was “plain dishonesty” meriting dismissal, said the Court. In a typical lofty prose, the Court proclaimed:

It is well to stress once again the constitutional declaration that a “(p)ublic office is a public trust.  Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.”

We have repeatedly held that although every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness and uprightness from an individual than in the judiciary.  Personnel in the judiciary should conduct themselves in such a manner as to be beyond reproach and suspicion, and free from any appearance of impropriety in their personal behavior, not only in the discharge of their official duties but also in their everyday life.  They are strictly mandated to maintain good moral character at all times and to observe irreproachable behavior so as not to outrage public decency.

Misconduct No. 2: Failure to disclose business interest in SAL[N]

Aside from dishonesty, respondent Flores was also found guilty of failure to disclose her business interest in her SAL[N].

The Supreme Court noted that respondent Flores herself admitted that she “had a stall in the market.”  The Court also found that she had been receiving rental payments for the use of the said market stall.  

The Court thus stated: “That respondent had a stall in the market was undoubtedly a business interest which should have been reported in her Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities.  Her failure to do so exposes her to administrative sanction.”

The Court then cited the legal basis for the penalty, also of dismissal, for such non-disclosure:

Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6713 provides that it is the “obligation” of an employee to submit a sworn statement, as the "public has a right to know" the employee’s assets, liabilities, net worth and financial and business interests.  Section 11 of the same law prescribes the criminal and administrative penalty for violation of any provision thereof.  Paragraph (b) of Section 11 provides that “(b) Any violation hereof proven in a proper administrative proceeding shall be sufficient cause for removal or dismissal of a public official or employee, even if no criminal prosecution is instituted against him...”

In the present case, the failure of respondent to disclose her business interest which she herself admitted is inexcusable and is a clear violation of Republic Act No. 6713.

“Same boat” with CJ Corona

It is therefore appropriate to say that CJ Corona is "in the same boat” – to borrow a phrase from rappler.com – with respondent Flores. The application of the Rabe v. Flores ruling against the Chief Magistrate is thus warranted.

Unless we all reason like defense lawyers, we can objectively say that the parallel circumstances of both cases are hard to ignore; that the applicability of the major premise in Rabe v. Flores to the case of CJ Corona is readily apparent.

Indeed, if “no position exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness and uprightness from an individual than in the judiciary,” then there is no reason why the standard used to dismiss a “lowly” court employee cannot be used to oust the primus inter pares of the High Tribunal.

CJ Corona committed a misfeasance by not declaring a very significant portion of his assets in his SALN. Is this an impeachable act? We can debate until we are all blue in the face and still disagree.

But to reasonable minds of either side of the debate, we can all agree that accountability must be extracted from the highest echelons of our officialdom. And if not by convicting CJ Corona, how else? If he were acquitted, he would have remained immune from prosecution. 

If I were a senator-judge, I would have convicted him, too. If only because, more than anyone else in the judiciary, he is supposed to be the epitome of good moral character and irreproachable behavior.