Part I of this four-part series is a
summary of the December 12, 2005 decision
of the Supreme Court 1st Division denying the Manotoks’ consolidated
petitions and sustaining the order for the cancellation of the their title without
a direct proceeding before the RTC and for the reconstitution of the Barques’
title.
Part II, on the other hand, is a summary
of the December 18, 2008 en banc resolution that reversed
the decision of the 1st Division and remanded the petitions to the
CA for further proceedings.
In this entry, we will look at the summary of the Court’s
August 24, 2010 en banc decision that (1) DENIED that the Manotoks’ petitions, the
Manahans’ petition-in-intervention, and the Barques’ petition for
reconstitution; (2) declared NULL AND
VOID TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) in the name of Severino Manotok IV, et al.,
TCT No. 210177 in the name of Homer L. Barque, and Deed of Conveyance No.
V-200022 issued to Felicitas B. Manahan;
(3) ordered The Register of Deeds of Caloocan City and/or
Quezon City to CANCEL the said
titles; and (4) DECLARED that the
subject Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate, Quezon City, legally belongs to the NATIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, without prejudice to the institution of REVERSION proceedings by the State through the Office of the
Solicitor General. We will also look at the dissenting opinions of the minority.
The
intervening facts
After the
promulgation of the December 12, 2005 decision, the Manotoks
filed several motions for reconsideration with the 1st Division but
these were all DENIED by the Court. The
decision of the 1st Division was later entered in the Book of
Entries of Judgment. But when the Barques moved for the execution of the
decision, the Manotoks sought the referral of the motion to the Court en banc,
which the Court en banc accepted on July 26, 2006.
Meanwhile,
the Manahans sought to intervene in the case, alleging that their
predecessor-in-interest, Vicente Manahan, was issued Sales Certificate No. 511 covering
the subject lot.
On
December 18, 2008, the Court promulgated an en banc resolution
that SET ASIDE the decision and
resolutions of the 1st Division and RECALLED the entry of judgment. Voting 8-6 with 1 abstention, the
Court REVERSED the decisions and
resolutions of the CA and the LRA, and REMANDED
the cases to the CA for further proceedings to determine the validity of
the Manotoks’ title.
In due
time, the CA received evidence with primary focus on whether the Manotoks can
trace their claim of title to a valid alienation by the Government of Lot No.
823 of the Piedad Estate, which was a Friar Land. The Barques and Manahans were
likewise allowed to present evidence on their respective claims that may have
an impact on the correct determination of the status of the Manotok title.
The CA
then submitted to the SC a Commissioner’s Report that served as basis for Court’s
August 24, 2010 en banc decision.
How the court en banc voted
The Court voted 9-5 with 1 abstention. Justice Villarama, Jr. wrote the opinion
for the Court. Concurring with him were Chief Justice Corona, and
Justices Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad, Perez, and Mendoza.
Justice Carpio, with whom Justices Velasco, Jr., and Brion concurred, wrote a dissenting opinion. Justice
Carpio Morales wrote a concurring and dissenting opinion. Justice Sereno
likewise dissented and reserved the right to issue a separate opinion. Justice
Nachura did
not take part.
The
issue
The “core issue” identified
and resolved by the Court was: Does the absence of approval of the Secretary of
the Interior/Agriculture and Natural Resources in Sale Certificate No. 1054 and
Deed of Conveyance No. 29204 in favor of the Manotoks warrant the annulment of
their title?
The Court’s ruling
The Court ruled in the AFFIRMATIVE and held that the absence of approval of the Secretary of the
Interior/Agriculture and Natural Resources in Sale Certificate No. 1054 and
Deed of Conveyance No. 29204 in favor of the Manotoks’ predecessor-in-interest warrants
the annulment of the Manotok title.
The ponencia of Justice Villarama
Justice Villarama cited as the central
legal basis of the Court’s ruling Section 18 of Act No. 1120, which provides: “SECTION 18. No lease or sale made by
Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands under the provisions of this Act shall be
valid until approved by the
Secretary of the Interior.” He then explained:
It is clear from the foregoing provision that the
sale of friar lands shall be valid only if approved by the Secretary of the
Interior (later the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce). . . [T]he approval
by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce is indispensable for the validity
of the sale of friar lands. xxx.
xxx xxx xxx
[T]he
absence of approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce in the sale
certificate and assignment of sale certificate made the sale null and
void ab initio. Necessarily, there can be no valid titles issued on
the basis of such sale or assignment. The Manotoks’ reliance on the presumption of
regularity in the statutorily prescribed transmittal by the Bureau of Lands to
the Register of Deeds of their deed of conveyance is untenable. In our
Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioners in Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, Inc., we
underscored the mandatory requirement in Section 18, as
follows:
Section 18 of Act No. 1120 or the Friar Lands Act
unequivocally provides: “No lease or sale made by the Chief of the Bureau of
Public Lands (now the Director of Lands) under the provisions of this Act shall
be valid until approved by the Secretary of the Interior (now, the Secretary of
Natural Resources).” Thus, petitioners’ claim of ownership must fail in the absence of positive
evidence showing the approval of the Secretary of Interior. Approval of
the Secretary of the Interior cannot simply be presumed or inferred from
certain acts since the law is explicit in its mandate. This
is the settled rule as enunciated in Solid State
Multi-Products Corporation vs. Court of Appeals and reiterated in Liao
vs. Court of Appeals. Petitioners have not offered any cogent reason
that would justify a deviation from this rule.
xxx xxx xxx
In the light of the foregoing, we hold that the Manotoks could
not have acquired ownership of the subject lot as they had no valid certificate
of sale issued to them by the Government in the first place. Sale Certificate
No. 1054 dated March 10, 1919 (Exh. 10) purportedly on file with the DENR-LMB,
conspicuously lacks the signature of the Director of Lands and the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. In fact, Exh. 10 was not
included among those official documents submitted by the OSG to the CA.
We underscore anew that friar lands can be alienated only upon proper
compliance with the requirements of Sections 11, 12 and 18 of Act No. 1120.
It was thus primordial for the Manotoks to prove their acquisition of its title
by clear and convincing evidence. This they failed to do. Accordingly,
this Court has no alternative but to declare the Manotok title null and
void ab initio, and Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate as still part of
the Government's patrimonial property, as recommended by the CA.
The
decades-long occupation by the Manotoks of Lot 823, their payment of real
property taxes and construction of buildings, are of no moment. It must
be noted that the Manotoks miserably failed to prove the existence of the title
allegedly issued in the name of Severino Manotok after the latter had paid in
full the purchase price. The Manotoks did not offer any explanation as to why the only copy of
TCT No. 22813 was torn in half and no record of documents leading to its
issuance can be found in the registry of deeds. As to the certification
issued by the Register of Deeds of Caloocan, it simply described the copy
presented (Exh. 5-A) as “DILAPIDATED” without stating if the original copy of
TCT No. 22813 actually existed in their records, nor any information on the
year of issuance and name of registered owner. While TCT No. 22813 was
mentioned in certain documents such as the deed of donation executed in 1946 by
Severino Manotok in favor of his children and the first tax declaration (Exh.
26), these do not stand as secondary evidence of an alleged transfer from OCT
No. 614. This hiatus in the evidence of the Manotoks further cast doubts
on the veracity of their claim.
As we stressed in Alonso:
Neither may the rewards of prescription be
successfully invoked by respondent, as it is an iron-clad dictum that
prescription can never lie against the Government. Since respondent failed to
present the paper trail of the property's conversion to private property, the
lengthy possession and occupation of the disputed land by respondent cannot be
counted in its favor, as the subject property being a friar land, remained part
of the patrimonial property of the Government. Possession of patrimonial
property of the Government, whether spanning decades or centuries, can
not ipso facto ripen into ownership.
Moreover, the rule that statutes of limitation do not run against the State,
unless therein expressly provided, is founded on the “the great principle of
public policy, applicable to all governments alike, which forbids that the
public interests should be prejudiced by the negligence of the officers or
agents to whose care they are confided.” (Emphasis supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
Considering that none of the
parties has established a valid acquisition under the provisions of Act
No. 1120, as amended, we therefore adopt the recommendation of the CA declaring
the Manotok title as null and void ab initio, and Lot 823 of the
Piedad Estate as still part of the patrimonial property of the Government.
The
dissent of Justice Carpio
Justice
Carpio dissented from the majority opinion insofar
as it declared that the absence of approval by the Secretary of the
Interior/Agriculture and Natural Resources of Sale Certificate No. 1054 and
Deed of Conveyance No. 29204 warrants the annulment of the Manotoks’ title.
On the majority’s
reliance on §18 of Act No. 1120, which provides that “[n]o lease or sale made
by Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands under the provisions of this Act shall
be valid until approved by the Secretary of the Interior,” Justice Carpio noted:
Under Section 18, any sale of
friar land by the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands (now Director of Lands)
shall not be valid until approved by the Secretary. This means that the
Secretary, under Section 18, approves the sale and thus signs the Deed of
Conveyance upon full payment of the purchase price. However, under
Section 12 of Act No. 1120, the Director of Lands signs the Sales Certificate
upon payment of the first instalment. xxx.
xxx xxx xxx
Under Section 12, it is only the Director of Land
who signs the Sales Certificate. The Sales Certificate operates as
a contract to
sell which, under
the law, the Director of Lands is authorized to sign and thus bind the
Government as seller of the friar land. This transaction is a
sale of private property because friar lands are patrimonial properties of the
Government. In short, the law expressly authorizes the Director of Lands
to sell private or patrimonial property of Government under a contract to sell.
On the other hand, under Section 18, the Secretary signs the Deed of Conveyance
because the Secretary must approve the sale made initially by the Director of
Lands. The Deed of Conveyance operates as a deed of absolute sale which the Secretary signs upon
full payment of the purchase price. The Deed of Conveyance, when presented, is
authority for the Register of Deeds to issue a new title to the buyer as
provided in Section 122 of the Land Registration Act.
On the citation by
the majority of the ruling in Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, Inc. and
other cases, which
held that the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce is
indispensable for the validity of the sale of friar lands, Justice Carpio disagreed and held:
T]he ruling
in Alonso was superseded with the issuance by then Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Secretary Michael T. Defensor of
DENR Memorandum Order No. 16-05, which provides:
WHEREAS, it appears that there are uncertainties in
the title of the land disposed by the Government under Act 1120 or the Friar
Lands Act due to the lack of the signature of the Secretary on the Deeds of
Conveyance;
WHEREAS, said Deeds of Conveyance were only issued
by the then Bureau of Lands (now the Land Management Bureau) after full payment
had been made by the applicants thereon subject to the approval of the
Secretary of the then Department of Interior, then Department of Agriculture
and Natural Resources and presently, the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, in accordance with Act 1120;
WHEREAS, some of these Deeds of Conveyance
on record in the field offices of the Department and the Land Management Bureau
do not bear the signature of the Secretary despite full payment by
the friar land applicant as can be gleaned in the Friar Lands Registry Book;
WHEREAS, it is only a ministerial duty on the part of the
Secretary to sign the Deed of Conveyance once the applicant had already made
full payment on the purchase price of the land;
WHEREFORE, for and in consideration of the above
premises, and in
order to remove all clouds of doubt regarding the validity of these
instruments, it is hereby declared that all Deeds of
Conveyance that do not bear the signature of the Secretary are deemed signed or
otherwise ratified by this Memorandum Order provided, however,
that full payment of the purchase price of the land and compliance with all the
other requirements for the issuance of the Deed of Conveyance under Act 1120
have been accomplished by the applicant;
This Memorandum Order, however, does not modify,
alter or otherwise affect any subsequent assignments, transfers and/or
transactions made by the applicant or his successors-in-interest or any rights
arising therefrom after the issuance of a Transfer Certificate of Title by the
concerned Registry of Deeds. (Italicization and boldfacing supplied)
Despite the issuance of DENR Memorandum Order No.
16-05, the majority still hold that the memorandum order does not apply to the
Manotoks' title. The majority assert that the Manotoks could not benefit from
DENR Memorandum Order No. 16-05 because the memorandum order refers only to
deeds of conveyance on file with the records of DENR “field offices.”
I find the majority's limited application of DENR
Memorandum Order No. 16-05 erroneous.
While the third WHEREAS clause of DENR Memorandum Order No. 16-05
refers to Deeds of Conveyance on record in the “field offices” of the DENR, the dispositive portion
categorically states that “all Deeds of Conveyance that do not
bear the signature of the Secretary are deemed signed or otherwise ratified” by the Memorandum Order. The word “all”
means everything, without exception. DENR Memorandum Order No.
16-05 should apply to all Deeds of Conveyance, as declared in its dispositive portion, and should
not be limited to those on file in DENR “field offices.” Clearly, as
expressly stated in Section 20 of Executive Order No. 192, all DENR Regional
Offices, including the Regional Office in NCR, are “field offices” of the DENR.
Quezon City, where the land in question is
situated, is under DENR's NCR “field office.” In 1919, when the Government sold the subject friar land to the
Manotoks' predecessors-in-interest, the land was part of the province of Rizal, which
also has a “field office.” Indisputably, DENR Memorandum Order No.
16-05 applies to all Deeds of Conveyance of friar lands anywhere in the
Philippines without exception. Thus, conveyances of land within the NCR,
including the conveyance to the Manotoks, are covered by DENR Memorandum
Order No. 16-05.
The first WHEREAS clause clearly states that what DENR Memorandum Order No. 16-05 seeks to cure are the “uncertainties
in the title of the land disposed by the Government under Act 1120 or the Friar
Lands Act due to the lack of signature of the Secretary on the Deeds of Conveyance.” If we apply DENR Memorandum Order No. 16-05 only to
Deeds of Conveyance on record in the “field offices” outside of NCR, the
purpose of the issuance of DENR Memorandum Order No. 16-05 will not
be fully accomplished.
xxx xxx xxx
The total area of friar lands in NCR, specifically in Muntinlupa,
Piedad, San Francisco de Malabon, Santa Cruz de Malabon, and Tala is
86,567.50 acres or 35,032.624 hectares. If DENR Memorandum Order No.
16-05 will not be applied to these areas, the Court will be disquieting the
titles held by generations of landowners since the passage in 1904 of Act No.
1120. Thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of landowners could be
dispossessed of their lands in these areas.
Justice Carpio held that Manotoks became owners of the subject
land upon their full payment of the purchase price to the Government on 7
December 1932. Upon such full payment, the Manotoks had the right to
demand conveyance of the land and issuance of the corresponding title to them.
He continued:
Thus, the Court has held that in cases of sale of friar lands, the only
recognized resolutory condition is non-payment of the full purchase price. Pursuant
to Section 12 of Act No. 1120, “upon payment of the last
installment together with all accrued interest[,] the Government will convey to
[the] settler and occupant the said land so held by him by proper instrument of
conveyance, which shall be issued and become effective in the manner provided
in section one hundred and twenty-two of the Land Registration Act.” Once it is shown that the full purchase price had been paid, the
issuance of the proper certificate of conveyance necessarily follows. There is
nothing more that is required to be done as the title already passes to the
purchaser.
The Court has ruled that equitable and
beneficial title to the friar land passes to the purchaser from the time the
first installment is paid and a certificate of sale is issued. When the
purchaser finally pays the final installment on the purchase price and is given
a deed of conveyance and a certificate of title, the title, at least in equity, retroacts to the time he first occupied the land, paid the first installment and
was issued the corresponding certificate of sale. The sequence then is
that a certificate of sale is issued upon payment of the first
installment. Upon payment of the final installment, the deed of
conveyance is issued.
It is the Deed of Conveyance that must bear the signature of the
Secretary of Interior/Agriculture because it is only when the final installment
is paid that the Secretary can approve the sale, the purchase price having been
fully paid. This is why DENR Memorandum Order No. 16-05 refers only to the Deed of
Conveyance, and not to the Sale Certificate, as the document that is “deemed
signed” by the Secretary. In short, Section 18 of Act No. 1120 which
states that “(n)o xxx sale xxx shall be valid until approved by the Secretary
of Interior” refers to the approval by the Secretary of the Deed of Conveyance.
DENR Memorandum Order No. 16-05 expressly
acknowledges that “it is only a ministerial duty on the part of the Secretary to sign the Deed of Conveyance once the
applicant had already made full payment on the purchase price of the land.” The majority expressly admit in their Reply
to the Dissenting Opinion that
Memorandum Order No. 16-05:
x x x correctly stated that it is only a ministerial
duty on the part of the Secretary to sign the Deed of Conveyance once
the applicant had made full payment on the purchase price of the land.
Jurisprudence teaches us that notwithstanding the failure of the government
to issue the proper instrument of conveyance when the purchaser
finally pays the final installment of the purchase price, the purchaser
of friar land still acquired ownership over the subject land.
(Italicization supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
To repeat, Deed of Conveyance No. 29204 expressly
and unequivocally acknowledged that Severino Manotok had fully paid the
purchase price to the Government. Since the majority expressly admit that upon full
payment of the purchase price it becomes the ministerial duty of the Secretary
to approve the sale, then the majority must also necessarily admit that the
approval of the Secretary is a mere formality that has been complied with by
the issuance of Memorandum Order No. 16-05. Since the majority further expressly admit that upon full payment
of the purchase price ownership of the friar land passes to the purchaser, despite the failure of the Secretary to sign the Deed
of Conveyance, then the majority
must also necessarily admit that the Manotoks became the absolute owners of the
land upon their full payment of the purchase price on 7 December 1932.
xxx xxx xxx
Indisputably, upon full payment of the purchase
price, full and absolute ownership passes to the purchaser of friar land.
In the case of the Manotoks’ title, the Deed of Conveyance was issued except
that it lacked the signature of the Secretary which the majority erroneously
hold is still indispensable pursuant to Alonso. However, Alonso should not be
applied to the Manotoks' title because DENR Memorandum Order No. 16-05 was not
yet issued when the Court decided Alonso. The absence of the Secretary’s signature in the Deed
of Conveyance in Alonso was never cured and hence the Court in Alonso voided
the Deed of Conveyance. Besides, in Alonso the corresponding
Torrens title was never issued even after a lapse of 66 years from the date of
the Deed of Conveyance. In sharp contrast, here the lack of the Secretary’s
signature in the Manotoks’ Deed of Conveyance No. 29204 was cured by the
issuance of DENR Memorandum Order No. 16-05, which expressly states that “all Deeds of Conveyance that do not bear the
signature of the Secretary are deemed signed or ratified x x x.” Moreover, the Manotoks have been issued their torrens
title way back in 1933. Section
122 of Act No. 496 states that “[i]t shall be the duty of the official issuing
the instrument of alienation, grant, or conveyance in behalf of the Government
to cause such instrument, before its delivery to the grantee, to be filed with
the register of deeds for the province where the land lies and to be there
registered like other deeds and conveyances, whereupon a certificate shall be
entered as in other cases of registered land, and an owner's duplicate
certificate issued to the grantee.” TCT No. 22813 would not have been
issued in the name of Severino Manotok if Deed of Conveyance No. 29204 had not
been delivered to the Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal to which the
land covered by the Manotoks’ title then belonged. The Manotoks should not be
punished if the documents leading to the issuance of TCT No. 22813 could no
longer be found in the files of the government office, considering that these
were pre-war documents and considering further the lack of proper preservation
of documents in some government agencies.
The fact remains that the Manotoks
were able to present a certified true copy of Deed of Conveyance No. 29204
secured from the National Archives which is the official repository of
government and public documents. This Deed of Conveyance No. 29204 was
signed by the Director of Lands and lacked only the signature of the Secretary
of Interior/Agriculture. Memorandum Order No. 16-05 speaks of “all Deeds of Conveyance that do not bear the signature of the Secretary” and
thus includes Deed of Conveyance No. 29204. Under Memorandum Order No. 16-05, such Deeds of
Conveyance “are deemed signed” by the Secretary. Clearly, Memorandum
Order No. 16-05 applies squarely to the Manotoks’ title for two reasons.
First, Deed of Conveyance No. 29204 was signed by the Director of Lands but
lacked only the signature of the Secretary. Second, the purchase price
for the land subject of Deed of Conveyance No. 29204 had been fully paid on 7
December 1932, more than 77 years ago.
The concurring and
dissenting opinion of Justice Carpio Morales
Justice Carpio Morales
held that the absence of the signature of the Secretary of the Interior/Agriculture and Natural Resources in
the Manotoks’ Sale Certificate No. 1054 and Deed
of Conveyance No. 29204 issued in
1919 and 1932, respectively, does not warrant the annulment of their title.
She
advanced the thesis the “[t]here is no absence of approval to speak of, since [the
Manotoks’] Deed of Conveyance is, pursuant to Order 16-05, deemed signed by the Department Secretary, and there is no legal basis for requiring another signature of the Department Secretary on the Sale Certificate.” She continued: “Contrary to the ponencia's position, Order 16-05 does not contravene Act No. 1120. Order
16-05 did not dispense with the requirement of the Department Secretary’s
approval. It recognizes that the approval of the Secretary is still
required, the grant or ratification of which is made subject only to certain
conditions, precisely “to remove all clouds of doubt regarding the validity of
these instruments” which do not bear his signature. The fulfillment of
the conditions must be proven to be extant in every case.”
Justice Carpio Morales likewise
submitted the proposition that “there is no statutory
basis for the requirement of the
Department Secretary's signature on the Certificate of Sale, apart from a
strained deduction of Section 18.” On the majority’s general proposition that a
claim of ownership must fail in the absence of positive evidence showing the
Department Secretary’s approval, which cannot simply be presumed or inferred
from certain acts, Justice Carpio Morales
countered: “Jurisprudential review is gainful only insofar as settling that
the “approval” by the Department Secretary is indispensable to the validity of
the sale. Case law does not categorically state that the required “approval” must
be in the form of a signature on
the Certificate of Sale.”
On what
constitutes the positive evidence of “approval” to
lend validity to the sale of friar lands, Justice
Carpio Morales held:
The ponencia concludes,
as a matter of course on the strength of Sections 11, 12 and 15, that the certificate of sale must be signed by the Department
Secretary for the sale to be
valid. As discussed earlier, these three Sections neither support the
theory that such signing is required in the sale certificate nor shed light to the specifics of approval.
I submit that the Department Secretary’s signature on the certificate
of sale is not one of the “requirements for the issuance of the Deed
of Conveyance under Act No. 1120.” To require another signature of the
Department Secretary on the Certificate of Sale, on top of that deemed placed
by Order 16-05 on the Deed of Conveyance, is to impose a redundant requirement and render irrelevant the spirit of said Order.
IN FINE,
petitioners having complied with the conditions for the applicability of Order
16-05, their Deed of Conveyance is “deemed signed or otherwise ratified” by
said Order.
It bears emphasis that Order 16-05 is a positive
act on the part of the Department Secretary to remedy the situation where, all other conditions having been established by competent evidence, the signature of the Department
Secretary is lacking. The Order aims to rectify a previous governmental
inaction on an otherwise legally valid claim, or affirm an earlier approval
shown to be apparent and consistent by a credible paper trail.
Obviously, the incumbent Department Secretary can
no longer probe into the deep recesses of his deceased predecessors, or unearth
irretrievably tattered documents at a time when the country and its records had
long been torn by war, just to satisfy himself with an explanation in the
withholding of the signature. The meat of Order 16-05 contemplates such
bone of contention as in the present case.
The cloud of
doubt regarding the validity of the conveyance to petitioners’
predecessors-in-interest having been removed by Order No. 16-05, petitioners’
title over Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate is, I submit, valid.
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