In Iglesia ni Cristo vs. CA, G.R. No. 119673, July 26,
1996,
several pre-taped episodes of the TV program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo” of
the religious group Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) were rated “X” – i.e., not for public viewing – by the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television
(now Movie and Television Review and Classification Board). These TV programs allegedly “offend[ed] and constitute[d] an
attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law” because
of petitioner INC’s controversial biblical interpretations and its “attacks”
against contrary religious beliefs.
Petitioner INC went to court to
question the actions of respondent Board. The RTC ordered the respondent Board
to grant petitioner INC the necessary permit for its TV programs. But on appeal
by the respondent Board, the CA reversed the RTC. The CA ruled that: (1) the
respondent Board has jurisdiction and power to review the TV program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo,” and (2) the
respondent Board did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it denied
permit for the exhibition on TV of the three series of “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo” on the ground that the materials constitute
an attack against another religion. The CA also found the subject TV series “indecent,
contrary to law and contrary to good customs.”
Petitioner INC appealed to the Supreme
Court. The issues resolved were: (1) Does respondent
Board have the power to review petitioner’s TV program?; and (2) Assuming it
has the power, did respondent Board gravely abuse its discretion when it
prohibited the airing of petitioner’s religious program?
The ruling of the Court and the separate
opinions
Justice Puno, with whom Justices Regalado, Davide, Romero, Francisco and Torres fully concurred, wrote the opinion of the Court.
Chief Justice Narvasa concurred in
the result. Justice Panganiban filed
a separate concurring opinion, joining the majority in upholding the review
power of the respondent Board, but limiting the grant of the petition only because
the respondent Board failed to justify its conclusion, using the proper
standards, that the subject tapes offended another religion.
Justice
Padilla wrote a concurring and dissenting opinion.
He joined the majority in granting the petition and lifting the ban against the
showing of petitioner’s TV programs, but dissented from the majority’s holding that
upheld respondent Board’s power to censor petitioner’s religious TV programs. On the other hand, Justice Mendoza wrote a separate opinion, holding Sec. 3(b) of P.D. No. 1986, which
gives to the Board limited time for review, to be valid, while finding Sec. 3(c),
under which the Board acted in this case in censoring petitioner's materials,
to be, on its face and as applied, unconstitutional.
Justice
Melo filed his concurring and dissenting opinion, also agreeing with the grant of the petition and the lifting of the ban against the
showing of the subject TV programs, but disagreeing with the upholding of the respondent Board's power to review petitioner’s religious TV programs. Justice Vitug wrote a separate opinion dismissing the petition and sustaining altogether both the respondent Board's review and classification power and its action in X-rating the subject TV programs. Finally, Justice Kapunan, with whom Justice Hermosisima joined, wrote a concurring and dissenting opinion, concurring in
reversing the action of the respondent Board, but disagreeing with the majority
in sustaining the review power of the respondent Board. [NOTE: Justice Bellosillo was on leave.]
The majority opinion
The majority sustained
the review power of the respondent Board over the religious program of the
petitioner:
We thus reject petitioner’s postulate that its religious
program is per se beyond review by the respondent
Board. Its public broadcast on TV of its religious program brings it out of the
bosom of internal belief. Television is a medium that reaches even the eyes and
ears of children. The Court iterates the rule that the exercise of religious
freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear and
present danger of some substantive evil which the State is duty bound to
prevent, i.e.,
serious detriment to the more overriding interest of public health, public morals,
or public welfare. A laissez
faire policy on the exercise
of religion can be seductive to the liberal mind but history counsels the Court
against its blind adoption as religion is and continues to be a volatile area
of concern in our country today. Across the sea and in our shore, the bloodiest
and bitterest wars fought by men were caused by irreconcilable religious
differences. Our country is still not safe from the recurrence of this
stultifying strife considering our warring religious beliefs and the fanaticism
with which some of us cling and claw to these beliefs. Even now, we have yet to
settle the near century old strife in Mindanao, the roots of which have been
nourished by the mistrust and misunderstanding between our Christian and Muslim
brothers and sisters. The bewildering rise of weird religious cults espousing
violence as an article of faith also proves the wisdom of our rule rejecting a
strict let alone policy on the exercise of religion. For sure, we shall continue to
subject any act pinching the space for the free exercise of religion to a
heightened scrutiny but we shall not leave its rational exercise to the
irrationality of man. For when religion divides and its exercise destroys, the
State should not stand still.
On the second issue of whether
respondent Board gravely abused its discretion when it prohibited the airing of
petitioner’s religious program, the Court reversed the ruling of the appellate
court and held:
First. Deeply ensconced in our fundamental law is its
hostility against all prior restraints on speech, including religious speech.
Hence, any act that restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of
invalidity and should be greeted with furrowed brows. It is the burden of the
respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge this
burden, its act of censorship will be struck down. It failed in the case at
bar.
Second. The evidence shows that the respondent
Board x-rated petitioners TV series for “attacking” either religions,
especially the Catholic church. An examination of the evidence, especially
Exhibits “A,” “A-1,” “B,” “C,” and “D” will show that the so-called “attacks”
are mere criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas
and tenets of other religions. The videotapes were not viewed by the respondent
court as they were not presented as evidence. Yet they were considered by the
respondent court as indecent, contrary to law and good customs, hence, can be
prohibited from public viewing under section 3(c) of PD 1986. This ruling
clearly suppresses petitioner's freedom of speech and interferes with its right
to free exercise of religion. It misappreciates the essence of freedom to
differ xxx.
xxx xxx xxx
In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political
belief, sharp differences arise. In both fields, the tenets of one man may seem
the rankest error to his neighbor. To persuade others to his own point of view,
the pleader, as we know, at times, resorts to exaggeration, to vilification of
men who have been, or are prominent in church or state or even to false
statements. But the people of this nation have ordained in the light of history
that inspite [sic] of the probability
of excesses and abuses, these liberties are, in the long view, essential to
enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part of the citizens of democracy.
The respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of
other religions by petitioner but that gives it no excuse to interdict such
criticisms, however, unclean they may be. Under our constitutional scheme, it
is not the task of the State to favor any religion by protecting it against an
attack by another religion. Religious dogmas and beliefs are often at war and
to preserve peace among their followers, especially the fanatics, the
establishment clause of freedom of religion prohibits the State from leaning
towards any religion. Vis-a-vis religious differences, the State
enjoys no banquet of options. Neutrality alone is its fixed and immovable
stance. In fine, respondent board cannot squelch the speech of petitioner
Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it attacks other religions, even if said
religion happens to be the most numerous church in our country. In a State
where there ought to be no difference between the appearance and the reality of
freedom of religion, the remedy against bad theology is better theology. The
bedrock of freedom of religion is freedom of thought and it is best served by
encouraging the marketplace of duelling ideas. When the luxury of time permits,
the marketplace of ideas demands that speech should be met by more speech for
it is the spark of opposite speech, the heat of colliding ideas that can fan
the embers of truth.
xxx xxx xxx
Fourth. In x-rating the TV program of the
petitioner, the respondents
failed to apply the clear and present danger rule. In American Bible Society v. City of Manila, this Court
held: “The constitutional guaranty of free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious
information. Any restraint of such right can be justified like other restraints
on freedom of expression on the ground that there is a clear and present danger of any substantive evil which the
State has the right to prevent.” In Victoriano
vs. Elizalde Rope Workers
Union, we further ruled that “. . . it is only where it is unavoidably
necessary to prevent an immediate
and grave danger to the
security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom
may be justified, and only to
the smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger.”
The records show that the decision of the respondent Board,
affirmed by the respondent appellate court, is completely bereft of findings of facts to justify the conclusion that the subject video tapes
constitute impermissible attacks against another religion. There is no showing
whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about
especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech,
including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only
by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil which has taken the life of a
reality already on ground.
On the thesis of the Court minority that
a “system of prior restraint may only be
validly administered by judges and not left to administrative
agencies [such as the respondent Board, and now the MTRCB],” it was held that
while
the thesis has a lot to commend itself, the Court is not ready to hold that it
is unconstitutional for Congress to grant an administrative body quasi-judicial power to preview and classify TV
programs and enforce its decision subject
to review by our courts. To be sure,
according to Justice Puno, legal scholars in the U.S. are still
debating the proposition whether or not courts
alone are competent to
decide whether speech is constitutionally protected. The issue involves highly
arguable policy considerations and can be better addressed by our legislators.
Justice
Panganiban’s separate concurrence
In his concurring opinion, Justice Panganiban averred that the proposition of petitioner INC
that the respondent Board’s authority extends
only to non-religious video materials but not to religious programs presented
more problems than solutions. Justice
Panganiban asked: Who will determine whether a given canned
material is religious or not, and therefore whether it can be publicly
exhibited or not without its passing through the Board? He preferred that the
State, which is constitutionally mandated to be neutral, continue to exercise
the power to make such determination though the respondent Board, rather than
leave it up to the producer, maker or exhibitor of such material, who/which,
because of vested interests would, in the normal course, be understandably
biased in his/its own favor. Justice
Panganiban had less discomfort with the idea of maintaining the censors’ quasi-judicial authority to review such
film materials, subject to appeal to the proper courts by aggrieved parties,
than with the prospect and consequences of doing away with such power
altogether.
On the issue of the propriety of the
banning of the INC program, Justice
Panganiban voted to grant the INC petition only because the issue cannot be
answered by the Court directly because the tape in question was never submitted
to the Court for viewing:
Unfortunately, we cannot answer this question directly
because the tape in question was never submitted to the Court for viewing.
Neither was there a detailed description of its objectionable contents in the
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals or Regional Trial Court. Nor is there
extant a detailed justification prepared by respondent Board on why it banned
the program – other than its bare conclusion
that the material constituted an attack against the Catholic and Protestant
religions.
In no wise can the “remarks” in the voting slips presented
before the trial court be considered sufficient justification for banning the showing of any material.
In
the face of such inadequacy of evidence and basis, I see no way that this Court
could authorize a suppression of a species of the freedom of speech on the
say-so of anyone – not even of the MRTCB. Paraphrasing People v. Fernando, the disputable
presumption (which is of statutory origin) that official duties have been
regularly performed must yield to the constitutionally enshrined freedoms of expression
and of religion. If courts are required to state the factual and legal bases of
their conclusions and judicial dispositions, with more reason must quasi-judicial officers such as censors,
especially when they curtail a fundamental right which is “entitled to the
highest priority and amplest protection.”
Justice Padilla’s concurring
and dissenting opinion
Although he joined the majority in
granting the petition, Justice Padilla
dissented from the majority ruling upholding the power of respondent Board to
subject to prior restraint petitioner’s religious television programs. He noted
that “[i]t should by now be . . . firmly rooted in this country that there can be no prior
restraints on the exercise of free speech, expression or religion unless such exercise poses a clear and
present danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right and even the
duty to prevent. The ban against such prior restraints will result, as it has
resulted in the past, in occasional abuses of free speech and expression but it
is immeasurably preferable to experience such occasional abuses of speech and
expression than to arm a governmental administrative agency with the authority
to censor speech and expression in accordance with legislative standards which
albeit apparently laudable in their nature, can very well be bent or stretched
by such agency to convenient latitudes as to frustrate and eviscerate the
precious freedoms of speech and expression.”
Justice
Padilla added: “[A]ny person who may feel aggrieved by the exercise
of free speech, expression and religion, is afforded, under our system, the
remedy of redress in the courts of law, justice and equity. In short, it is far
better for the individual to live in a climate of free speech and free
expression, devoid of prior restraints, even at the risk of occasional excesses
of such freedoms than to exist in an ambiance of censorship which is always a
step closer to autocracy and dictatorship.”
Justice
Vitug’s separate opinion
Justice Vitug, meanwhile,
dissented and would altogether dismiss the petition of the INC. He would
sustain the action of the respondent Board, reasoning as follows:
The Board disapproved the exhibition of a series of
television programs of petitioner on the ground that they tend to “offend and
constitute an attack against other religions.” xxx. A reading of Section 3 of
P.D. 1986 shows that the Board is empowered to “screen, review and examine all
. . . television programs” and to “approve or disprove, delete objectionable
portion from and/or prohibit the . . . television broadcast of . . . television
programs . . . which, in the judgment of the BOARD (so) applying contemporary
Filipino cultural values as standard, are objectionable for being immoral,
indecent, contrary to law and/or good customs . . . .” I
believe that the phrase “contrary to law” should be read together with other
existing laws such as, for instance, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code,
particularly Article 201, which prohibits the exhibition of shows that “offend
another race or religion.” I see in this provision a good and sound standard.
Recent events indicate recurrent violent incidents between and among
communities with diverse religious beliefs and dogma. The danger is past mere
apprehension; it has become a virtual reality and now prevalent in some parts
of the world.
In order not to infringe constitutional principles, any
restriction by the Board must, of course, be for legitimate and valid reasons.
I certainly do not think that prior censorship should altogether be rejected
just because sanctions can later be imposed. Regulating the exercise of a right
is not necessarily an anathema to it; in fact, it can safeguard and secure that
right.
xxx xxx xxx
When I particularly ponder on the magnitude of the power of a
television set, I find it more prudent to have a deferment of an exhibition
that may be perceived to be contrary to decency, morality, good customs or the
law until, at least, the courts are given an opportunity to pass upon the
matter than rely merely on the availability of retribution for actual injury
sustained. A delay is not too high a price to pay for a possible damage to
society that may well turn out to be incalculable and lasting.
Justice
Kapunan’s concurring and dissenting opinion
Finally, Justice
Kapunan filed his concurring and dissenting opinion disagreeing with the
majority on the issue of whether the respondent Board may validly impose prior
restraint on the subject TV programs of petitioner INC:
It is my submission that the government, under the guise
of its regulatory powers in the censorship law (P.D. 1986 and its corresponding
implementing rules and regulations), does not have the power to interfere with
the exercise of religious expression in film or television by requiring the
submission of the video tapes of petitioner's religious program before their
public viewing, absent a showing of a compelling state interest that overrides
the constitutional protection of the freedom of expression and worship. Even if
government can demonstrate a compelling state interest, it would only burden
such fundamental right like the free exercise of religion by the least
intrusive means possible. There is no demonstration here of any sufficient
state interest to justify the infringement.
In any case, petitioner's religious programs, which in
their very essence and characterization are the exercise of religious freedom,
cannot possibly come under the category of the objectionable matters enumerated
in Section 3(c) of P.D. 1986 or analogous thereto. It is not likely that
propagation of religion which has been spoken of as “a profession of faith that
binds and elevates man to his Creator” will
involve pornography excessive violence or danger to national security.
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, the censor's cut poses a peculiar danger because it
altogether skirts time-honored judicial tests and standards utilized in
determining those forms of expression that fall within the area of protected
speech or expression, and because, as between prior restraints and the
subsequent sanctions meted after proof of violation of specific penal statutes,
the former prevents the speech or expression from entering the marketplace of
ideas. That is exactly the effect of the orders assailed by petitioner in the
instant case. More significantly, under the specific facts and circumstances of
the case confronting us, what is sought to be kept out of the marketplace of
ideas is not only ordinary speech or expression, two constitutional values
which already enjoy primacy among our civil rights, but also religious speech
or expression utilizing the medium of television.
xxx xxx xxx
Our penal law punishes libel, or acts or speeches
offensive to other religions, and awards damages whenever warranted. In our
legal scheme, courts essentially remain the arbiters of the controversies
affecting the civil and political rights of persons. It is our courts which
determine whether or not certain forms of speech and expression have exceeded
the bounds of correctness, propriety or decency as to fall outside the area of
protected speech. In the meantime, the liberties protected by the speech and
expression and free exercise clauses are so essential to our society that they
should be allowed to flourish unobstructed and unmolested.
xxx xxx xxx
I share with Justice Mendoza’s view that the majority’s
pronouncement would in effect place on the producer or exhibitor the burden of
going to court and of showing that his film or program is constitutionally
protected. This throws overboard the fundamental tenet that any act that
restrains speech is presumed invalid and it is the burden of the censor to
overthrow this presumption. In the context of the present case, if the Board
disapproves a TV religious program or deletes a portion thereof, it is the
exhibitor or producer who will go to court to prove that the Board is wrong and
the court will not interfere with the Board’s decision unless it can be clearly
shown that it is wrong, following the ruling in Sotto vs. Ruiz.
The majority’s ruling, I am afraid, constitutes a threat to constitutionally
protected speech and expression and supplants a judicial standard for
determining constitutionally protected speech and expression with the censor's
standard. The heavy burden on the imposition of prior restraints is shifted
away from the state by imposing upon the exhibitor the obligation of proving
that the religious programs fall within the realm of protected expression. This
leaves the exhibitor with only two unwanted options: either 1) he himself
deletes the portions which he anticipates the Board might possibly object to
prior to submission to that body and thereby obtains the censor's nod, or 2)
submits the Video tapes in their entirety and risks disapproval or deletion, in
which case he may go to court and show that the Video tapes contain
constitutionally protected speech and expression. In the first situation, the
message loses its essence and substance. The second scenario may entail
tremendous amount of money, time and effort in a prolonged litigation. Either
case constitutes grievous assault on the freedom of speech and religion.
Freedom of religion and expression is
the rule and its restriction, the exception. Any prior restriction on the
exercise of the freedom to profess religious faith and the propagation thereof
will unduly diminish that religion's authority to spread what it believes to be
the sacred truth. The State can exercise no power to restrict such right until
the exercise thereof traverses the point that will endanger the order of civil
society.
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