Still in connection with Search and
Seizure, I am sharing here the ruling of the High Tribunal in the case of Roberts vs. CA, G.R. No. 113930, March 5, 1996. We look into the ponencia first, then the dissent of Justice Puno.
This case involves the prosecution of petitioners Roberts, et al., corporate
officers and members of the Board of Directors of [the former] Pepsi Cola Products
Phils., Inc. in connection with the company promotion called “Number Fever.”
The private complainants were handlers of the supposedly winning “349” Pepsi
crowns. The cases filed against petitioners were (1) estafa under
Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code; (2) violation of R.A. No. 7394, (The Consumer
Act of the Philippines); (3) violation of E.O. No. 913 (Strengthening the
Rule-Making and Adjudicatory Powers of the Minister of Trade and Industry in
order to further Protect Consumers); and
(d) violation of Act No. 2333 (An Act
Relative to Untrue, Deceptive and Misleading Advertisements, as
amended). Probable cause was however found by the investigating prosecutor only
for the crime of estafa, but not for the other alleged offenses.
On 12 April 1993, the information was
filed with the trial court without anything accompanying it. A copy of the Joint
Resolution was forwarded to and received by the trial court only on 22 April 1993. Moreover, no affidavits
of the witnesses, transcripts of stenographic notes of the proceedings during
the preliminary investigation, or other documents submitted in the course
thereof were found in the records of the case as of 19 May 1993.
On April 15,
1993, petitioners Roberts, et al. filed a petition for review to the Secretary
of Justice seeking the reversal of the finding of probable cause by the
investigating prosecutor. They also moved for the suspension of the proceedings
and the holding in abeyance of the issuance of warrants of arrest against them.
Meanwhile, the public prosecutor also moved to defer the arraignment of the
accused-appellants pending the final disposition of the appeal to the Secretary
of Justice. On 17 May 1993, respondent Judge Asuncion issued the challenged order
(1) denying, on the basis of Crespo vs. Mogul, the foregoing
motions respectively filed by the petitioners and the public prosecutor, and
directing the issuance of the warrants of arrest “after June 1993” and setting
the arraignment on 28 June 1993. In part, respondent judge stated in his order:
This
case is already pending in this Court for trial. To follow whatever opinion the
Secretary of Justice may have on the matter would undermine the independence
and integrity of this Court. This Court is still capable of administering
justice.
The
Supreme Court in the case of Crespo vs. Mogul (SCRA 151, pp. 471-472)
stated as follows:
In order therefor to avoid such a situation
whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the
fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should,
as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or
appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has
already been filed in Court. The matter should be left entirely for the
determination of the Court.
Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that the respondent
judge had not the slightest basis at all for determining probable cause when he
ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest. After finding that a copy of
the public prosecutor’s Joint Resolution had in fact been forwarded to, and
received by, the trial court on 22 April
1993, the CA denied petitioners’ application for writ of preliminary
injunction. The CA ruled that the Joint Resolution “was sufficient in itself to
have been relied upon by respondent Judge in convincing himself that probable
cause indeed exists for the purpose of issuing the corresponding warrants of
arrest” and that the “mere silence of the records or the absence of any express
declaration” in the questioned order as to the basis of such finding does not
give rise to an adverse inference, for the respondent Judge enjoys in his favor
the presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duty.
Roberts, et al. sought reconsideration from the CA, but while this was
pending before the CA, the Secretary of Justice affirmed the finding of probable
cause by the investigating prosecutor. The CA therefore dismissed the petition
for mootness.
The issues before the
Supreme Court
Petitioners went to the Supreme Court and raised the following issues:
1. Did Judge Asuncion commit grave abuse
of discretion in denying, on the basis of Crespo vs. Mogul, the motions to suspend proceedings
and hold in abeyance the issuance of warrants of arrest and to defer
arraignment until after the petition for review filed with the DOJ shall have
been resolved?
2. Did Judge Asuncion commit grave abuse
of discretion in ordering the issuance of warrants of arrest without examining
the records of the preliminary investigation?
3. Did the DOJ, through its 349
Committee, gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the petition for review because
of (a) the resolution of the CA denying the application for a writ of
preliminary injunction and (b) of Judge Asuncion’s denial of the motions?
4. Did the CA commit grave abuse of
discretion (a) in denying the motion for a writ of preliminary injunction
solely on the ground that public respondent Asuncion had already before him the
Joint Resolution of the investigating prosecutor when he ordered the issuance
of the warrants of arrest, and (b) in ultimately dismissing the petition on the
ground of mootness since the DOJ has [already] dismissed the petition for
review?
5. May the Supreme Court determine in
this [sic] proceedings the existence
of probable cause either for the issuance of warrants of arrest against the
petitioners or for their prosecution for the crime of estafa?
The Court’s ruling
[The Court, in a 7-5-2 vote, GRANTED the petition. It SET ASIDE the decision and resolution
of the CA, the resolutions of the DOJ 349 Committee, and the order of
respondent judge. Mr. Justice Davide wrote the opinion for the Court.
Joining him were Associate Justices Padilla,
Bellosillo, Hermosisima and Vitug. Chief Justice Narvasa, with
whom Justice Vitug also joined, wrote a separate concurring opinion. On
the other hand, Mr. Justice Puno, joined by Associate Justices Romero, Melo and Mendoza,
wrote a dissenting opinion. Justices Francisco and Panganiban took no part.]
1.
YES,
Judge Asuncion committed grave abuse of discretion in denying, on the basis of Crespo
vs. Mogul, the motions to
suspend proceedings and hold in abeyance the issuance of warrants of arrest and
to defer arraignment until after the petition for review filed with the DOJ
shall have been resolved.
There is
nothing in Crespo vs. Mogul which bars the DOJ from taking
cognizance of an appeal, by way of a petition for review, by an accused in a
criminal case from an unfavorable ruling of the investigating prosecutor. It
merely advised the DOJ to, “as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a
petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint
or information has already been filed in Court.”
Whether
the DOJ would affirm or reverse the challenged Joint Resolution is still a
matter of guesswork. Accordingly, it was premature for respondent Judge
Asuncion to deny the motions to suspend proceedings and to defer arraignment on
the following grounds:
This
case is already pending in this Court for trial. To follow whatever opinion the
Secretary of Justice may have on the matter would undermine the independence
and integrity of this Court. This Court is still capable of administering
justice.
The real and ultimate test of the
independence and integrity of this court is not the filing of the
aforementioned motions [to suspend proceedings and issuance of warrants of
arrest and to defer arraignment] at that stage but the filing of a motion to
dismiss or to withdraw the information on the basis of a resolution of the
petition for review reversing the Joint Resolution of the investigating
prosecutor. However, once
a motion to dismiss or withdraw the information is filed the trial judge may
grant or deny it, not out of subservience to the Secretary of Justice, but in
faithful exercise of judicial prerogative.
2.
YES,
Judge Asuncion committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the issuance of
warrants of arrest without examining the records of the preliminary
investigation.
The teachings then of Soliven, Inting, Lim, Allado, and Webb reject the proposition that the
investigating prosecutor’s certification in an information or his resolution
which is made the basis for the filing of the information, or both, would
suffice in the judicial determination of probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest. In Webb, this Court assumed that since the
respondent Judges had before them not only the 26-page resolution of the
investigating panel but also the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses and
even the counter-affidavits of the respondents, they (judges) made personal evaluation of the
evidence attached to the records of the case.
Unfortunately,
in this case, nothing accompanied the information upon its filing on 12 April
1993 with the trial court. As found by the CA, a copy of the Joint Resolution
was forwarded to, and received by, the trial court only on 22 April 1993. And
as revealed by the certification of
Branch Clerk of Court Gibson Araula, Jr., no affidavits of the witnesses,
transcripts of stenographic notes of the proceedings during the preliminary
investigation, or other documents submitted in the course thereof were found in
the records of this case as of 19 May 1993. Clearly, when respondent Judge Asuncion issued the assailed
order of 17 May 1993 directing, among other things, the issuance of warrants of
arrest, he had only the information, amended information, and Joint Resolution
as bases thereof. He did not have the records or evidence supporting the
prosecutor's finding of probable cause. And strangely enough, he made no
specific finding of probable cause; he merely directed the issuance of warrants
of arrest “after June 21, 1993.” It may, however, be argued that the directive
presupposes a finding of probable cause. But then compliance with a constitutional requirement for the
protection of individual liberty cannot be left to presupposition, conjecture,
or even convincing logic.
3.
YES,
the DOJ, through its 349 Committee, gravely abused its discretion in dismissing
the petition for review because of: (a) the resolution of the CA denying the
application for a writ of preliminary injunction and (b) of Judge Asuncion’s
denial of the motions.
The
DOJ decision to give due course to the petition must have been prompted by
nothing less than an honest conviction that a review of the Joint Resolution
was necessary in the highest interest of justice in the light of the special
circumstances of the case. That decision was permissible within the “as far as
practicable” criterion in Crespo.
Hence, the DOJ committed grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the
petition simply because it thought that a review of the Joint Resolution would
be an exercise in futility in that any further action on its part would depend
on the sound discretion of the trial court, and that the latter’s denial of the
motion to defer arraignment filed at the instance of the DOJ was clearly an
exercise of that discretion or was, in effect, a signal to the Department that
the determination of the case is within the court’s exclusive jurisdiction and
competence. This infirmity becomes more pronounced because the reason adduced
by the respondent Judge for his denial of the motions to suspend proceedings
and hold in abeyance issuance of warrants of arrest and to defer arraignment
finds, as yet, no support in Crespo.
4.
YES,
public respondent CA committed grave abuse of discretion (a) in denying the
motion for a writ of preliminary injunction solely on the ground that public
respondent Asuncion had already before him the Joint Resolution of the
investigating prosecutor when he ordered the issuance of the warrants of
arrest, and (b) in ultimately dismissing the petition on the ground of mootness
since the DOJ has [already] dismissed the petition for review.
If
the only issue before the CA were the denial of the petitioners’ and public
prosecutor’s respective motions, which were both based on the pendency of the
petition for the review of the Joint Resolution before the DOJ, the dismissal of
the petition by the CA because of the dismissal by the DOJ of the petition for
review might have been correct. However, the petition likewise involved the
issue of whether respondent Judge Asuncion gravely abused his discretion in
ordering the issuance of warrants of arrest despite want of basis. The DOJ's
dismissal of the petition for review did not render moot and academic the
latter issue.
The
CA merely assumed that Judge Asuncion had read and relied on the Joint
Resolution, and that he was convinced that probable cause exists for the
issuance of the warrants of arrest against the petitioners. Nothing in the
records provides reasonable basis for these assumptions. In his assailed order,
the respondent judge made no mention of the Joint Resolution, which was
attached to the records of Criminal Case No. Q-93-43198 on 22 April 1993.
Neither did he state that he found probable cause for the issuance of warrants
of arrest. And, for an undivinable reason, he directed the issuance of warrants
of arrest only “after June 21, 1993.” If he did
read the Joint Resolution and, in so reading, found probable cause, there was
absolutely no reason at all to delay for more than one month the issuance of
warrants of arrest. The most probable explanation for such delay could be that
the respondent judge had actually wanted to wait for a little while for the DOJ
to resolve the petition for review.
It
is, nevertheless, contended in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Reynato S.
Puno that whatever doubts may have lingered on the issue of probable cause was
dissolved when no less than the CA sustained the finding of probable cause made
by the respondent Judge after an evaluation of the Joint Resolution. This is
anchored on erroneous premises. In its 1 July 1993 resolution, the CA does not
at all state that it either sustained Judge Asuncion’s finding of probable
cause, or found by itself probable cause. As discussed above, it merely
presumed that Judge Asuncion might have read the Joint Resolution and found
probable cause from a reading thereof. Then too, that statement in the dissenting opinion
erroneously assumes that the Joint Resolution can validly serve as sufficient
basis for determining probable cause. It is not.
5.
NO,
the Supreme Court MAY NOT determine in this [sic] proceedings the existence of
probable cause either for the issuance of warrants of arrest against the
petitioners or for their prosecution for the crime of estafa.
Ordinarily,
the determination of probable cause is not lodged with this Court. Its duty in
an appropriate case is confined to the issue of whether the executive or
judicial determination, as the case may be, of probable cause was done without
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
want of jurisdiction. This is consistent with the general rule that criminal
prosecutions may not be restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or
final. There are, however, exceptions to this rule. Among the exceptions are
enumerated in Brocka vs. Enrile as
follows:
a.
To
afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused
(Hernandez vs. Albano, et al., L-19272, January 25, 1967, 19 SCRA 95);
b.
When
necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or
multiplicity of actions (Dimayuga, et al. vs. Fernandez, 43 Phil. 304;
Hernandez vs. Albano, supra;
Fortun vs. Labang, et al., L-38383, May 27, 1981, 104 SCRA 607);
c.
When
there is a pre-judicial question which is sub
judice (De Leon vs. Mabanag,
70 Phil. 202);
d.
When
the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority (Planas vs. Oil,
67 Phil. 62);
e.
Where
the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation (Young vs.
Rafferty, 33 Phil. 556; Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 389);
f.
When
double jeopardy is clearly apparent (Sangalang vs. People and Avendia, 109
Phil. 1140);
g.
Where
the court has no jurisdiction over the offense (Lopez vs. City Judge, L-25795,
October 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 616);
h.
Where
it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution (Rustia vs. Ocampo, CA-G.R.
No. 4760, March 25, 1960);
i.
Where
the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance (Recto
vs. Castelo, 18 L.J. [1953], cited in Rañoa vs. Alvendia, CA-G.R. No. 30720-R,
October 8, 1962; Cf. Guingona, et al. vs. City Fiscal,
L-60033, April 4, 1984, 128 SCRA 577); and
j.
When
there is clearly no prima
facie case against the
accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied (Salonga vs. Paño,
et al., L- 59524, February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA 438).
k.
Preliminary
injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent to threatened
unlawful arrest of petitioners (Rodriguez vs. Castelo, L- 6374, August 1,
1953). (cited in Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, p. 188, 1988 Ed.)
In
these exceptional cases, this Court may ultimately resolve the existence or
non-existence of probable cause by examining the records of the preliminary
investigation, as it did in Salonga
vs. Paño, Allado, and Webb.
We
shall not, however, reevaluate the evidence to determine if indeed there is
probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest in this case. For the
respondent judge did not, in fact, find that probable cause exists, and if he
did he did not have the basis therefor. Moreover, the records of the
preliminary investigation in this case are not with this Court. They were
forwarded by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to the DOJ in
compliance with the latter's 1st Indorsement of 21 April 1993. The trial court
and the DOJ must be required to perform their duty.
The dissent of Justice Puno
Justice Puno
vigorously dissented from the majority decision. His thesis was that the forwarding of complete records
of the case from the investigating prosecutor to the court is not necessary for
the determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest when
the prosecutor’s report is exhaustive and accurate. He wrote:
A revisit of our case
law will reveal that what we condemned in the past as constitutionally
impermissible was the practice of judges of totally relying on pro forma
certifications of fiscals that they conducted a preliminary investigation and
found probable cause that the accused committed the crime charged in the
Information. These pro forma certifications usually consisted of a short
sentence. They did not relate the relevant proceedings in the preliminary
investigation nor did they calibrate the weight of diverse and duelling evidence
submitted by the parties. These bare certifications carried no findings of fact
and made no legal analysis which could be used by judges as a rational basis
for a determination of probable cause. Thus, we laid down the jurisprudence
that a judge who determines probable cause by relying on such meaningless
certifications violates the constitutional provision prohibiting issuance of
warrants of arrest “. . . except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge . . .”
The case at bar does not
involve these outlawed certifications. The respondent Court of Appeals found
that the 17-page Joint Resolution of the prosecutors provided the trial judge
with sufficient factual basis to find probable cause and to issue warrants of
arrest against the petitioners. To repeat, the finding of probable cause
against petitioners rests on two (2) critical facts established by evidence:
one, that petitioners deviated from the Department of Trade and Industry rules
when they required that only “349” crowns with security codes could win, and
two, that petitioners attempted to substitute “134” for “349” as the winning
number. The finding of deviation is based on the Task Force Report of the DTI,
the relevant portion of which was liberally quoted in the prosecutors’ Joint
Resolution. The finding of attempt at substitution was taken from the
affidavits of witnesses of the private respondents. Petitioners do not charge
that the Task Force Report of the DTI and the affidavits of witnesses of the
private respondents were incorrectly quoted by the prosecutors in their joint
Resolution. Thus, respondent judge need not be burdened by the duty of ordering
the elevation of the complete records of the preliminary investigation to check
the accuracy of the critical evidence as stated in the Joint Resolution.
The majority opinion
also flays Judge Asuncion allegedly because ‘. . . he made no finding of
probable cause . . .’ I am not disposed to make this serious charge. When Judge
Asuncion issued the warrants of arrest against petitioners, I assume as did the
respondent Court of Appeals, that he had studied the Information and 17-page
Resolution of the prosecutors and that he agreed with the prosecutors' finding
of probable cause. It is unnecessary for him to issue an Order just to
reiterate the findings of the prosecutors. It ought to be likewise underscored
that before Judge Asuncion issued the warrants of arrest, the matter of
probable cause was the subject of exhaustive pleadings before him. Thus, the
parties submitted the following for the respondent judge's consideration: (1)
Motions to Suspend Proceedings and to Hold in Abeyance Issuance of Warrants of
Arrest; (2) Motion for Issuance of Warrants of Arrest; (3) Supplemental Urgent
Motion to Hold in Abeyance Issuance of Warrants of Arrest and to Suspend
Proceedings; (4) Opposition to Motion to Defer Arraignment; (5) Objection and
Opposition to Motion to Suspend Proceedings and to Hold in Abeyance the
Issuance of Warrants of Arrest; and (6) Memorandum in Support of the Motion to Suspend
Proceedings and to Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of the Warrants of Arrest. In
these pleadings, the parties, especially the petitioners, discussed in length
and in depth the findings of the prosecutors as contained in their 17-page
Joint Resolution. It is, thus, erroneous to assume that the respondent judge
had nothing before him when he ruled that there is probable cause to charge
petitioners with estafa.
No comments:
Post a Comment