In Columbia Pictures vs. Flores, G.R. No. 78631, June 29, 1993, paragraph (c) of the subject search
warrant authorized the search and seizure of “[t]elevision sets, video
cassette recorders, rewinders, tape head cleaners, accessories, equipment and
other machines and paraphernalia or materials used or intended to be used in the unlawful sale, lease,
distribution, or possession for purpose of sale, lease, distribution,
circulation or public exhibition of the above-mentioned pirated video tapes
which they are keeping and concealing in the premises above-described . . .”
When respondent FGT Video Network, Inc., the video
distribution establishment subject of the warrant, moved for the release of
television sets, video cassette recorders, rewinders, tape head cleaners,
accessories, equipment and other machines or paraphernalia seized by virtue of
the subject warrant, the respondent court granted the motion and ordered the
release of the said items, leaving only in the custody of the court the seized
video cassette tapes.
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the respondent
judge did not gravely abuse his discretion in ordering the immediate release of
the enumerated items because paragraph (c) was in the nature of a general
warrant. The Court held that the respondent judge was merely rectifying his own
error, thus:
[R]espondent
court was merely correcting its own erroneous conclusions in issuing Search
Warrant No. 45 when it ordered the return of the seized television sets and
other paraphernalia specified in the motion filed by FGT. This can be gleaned
from its statement that “. . . the machines and equipment could have been used
or intended to be used in the illegal reproduction of tapes of the copyrighted
motion pictures/films, yet, it cannot be said with moral certainty that the
machines or equipment(s) were used in violating the law by the mere fact that
pirated video tapes of the copyrighted motion pictures/films were reproduced.
As already stated, FGT
Video Network, Inc. is a registered and duly licensed distributor and in
certain instances and under special instructions . . . reproducer of
videograms, and as such, it has the right to keep in its possession, maintain
and operate reproduction equipment(s) and paraphernalia(s).
The Supreme Court however concluded differently in Microsoft Corp. vs. Maxicorp, Inc., G.R. No.
140946, September 13, 2004. In this case, paragraph (e) of the subject search
warrant authorized the search and seizure of “[c]omputer hardware, including
central processing units including hard disks, CD-ROM drives, keyboards,
monitor screens and diskettes, photocopying machines and other equipment or
paraphernalia used or intended to be used in the illegal and
unauthorized copying or reproduction of Microsoft software and their manuals,
or which contain, display or otherwise exhibit, without the authority of
MICROSOFT CORPORATION, any and all Microsoft trademarks and copyrights.”
The Court held that paragraph (e) is not
a general warrant since the articles to be seized were not only sufficiently
identified physically; they were also specifically identified by stating their
relation to the offense charged. Paragraph (e), the Court said, specifically
refers to those articles used or intended for use in the illegal and
unauthorized copying of petitioners’ software. This language meets the test of
specificity.
In distinguishing Microsoft from Columbia, the High Tribunal
explained that the phrase
“used or intended to be used” [for the crime specified in the warrant] is not
in itself determinative of the question of particularity. Rather, the
particular factual circumstances surrounding the case determine whether the
subject warrant is too broad. In
Microsoft, Maxicorp,
Inc. is not a licensed distributor
of Microsoft Corporation software; in Columbia, the defendant FGT Video
Network, Inc. was a licensed distributor
of video tapes, thus:
The cases cited by
the Court of Appeals [in justifying the quashal of the subject search warrant]
are inapplicable. In those cases, the Court found the warrants too broad
because of particular circumstances, not because of the mere use of the phrase
‘used or intended to be used.’ In Columbia
Pictures, Inc. v. Flores, the warrants ordering the seizure of
‘television sets, video cassette recorders, rewinders and tape cleaners x x x’
were found too broad since the
defendant there was a licensed distributor of video tapes. The
mere presence of counterfeit video tapes in the defendant’s store does not mean
that the machines were used to produce the counterfeit tapes. The situation in
this case is different. Maxicorp
is not a licensed distributor of petitioners. In Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc., et al. v.
Judge Ruiz, et al., the Court voided the warrants because they
authorized the seizure of records pertaining to ‘all business transactions’ of
the defendant. And in 20th Century
Fox Film Corp. v. Court of Appeals, the Court quashed the warrant
because it merely gave a list of articles to be seized, aggravated by the fact
that such appliances are ‘generally connected with the legitimate business of
renting out betamax tapes.’
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