And so it came to pass. The unprecedented clash
of the titans has escalated and resulted in the impeachment of the god-chief of
Padre Faura by the minions of the god-king of Malacañang. On Monday, December
12, 2011, Chief Justice Renato Corona of the Philippine Supreme
Court was impeached by the administration-dominated House of Representatives.
The House blitzkrieg was dizzying. In a
matter of just a few hours, 188 solons – more than 1/3 of the total House
membership – signed the impeachment complaint, ostensibly without even
bothering to read the full text of the charges levelled against CJ Corona. The
vote effectively resulted in the bypassing of plenary debates and enabled the President’s
allies to transmit the Articles of Impeachment straight to the Senate.
Meanwhile, the Senators of the 15th
Congress who are to act as judges in the impeachment trial (many of whom
are re-electionists in this coming May 2013 elections), are already secretly
salivating at the prospect of getting free media exposure for their grandstanding.
The
alleged impeachable offenses
The impeachable offenses allegedly committed
by CJ Corona include (1)
graft and corruption, (2) culpable violation of the Constitution, and (3) betrayal
of public trust. These offenses are spread into eight Articles of
Impeachment – categorized by the Chief Justice himself as pertaining to either
his personal acts or his official actions in the High Tribunal – and include,
as the Inquirer reported,[1] the following:
1.
Partiality and subservience in cases
involving the Arroyo administration
from the time of his appointment as Supreme Court associate justice up to his
dubious midnight appointment as Chief Justice and up to the present;
2.
Failure to disclose to the public his statement of assets, liabilities, and net worth as required
under Section 17 Article XI of the
Constitution;
3.
Failure
to meet and observe the stringent standards under the Constitution that
provided that a member of the judiciary must be a person of proven competence,
integrity, probity, and independence in allowing
the Supreme Court to act on mere letters filed by a counsel which caused
the issuance of flip-flopping decisions
in final and executory cases; in creating an excessive entanglement with Mrs. Arroyo through her appointment of
his wife to office; and in discussing
with litigants cases pending in the Supreme Court;
4.
Blatantly
disregarding the principle of separation
of powers by issuing a status quo ante order against the House of
Representatives in the case concerning the impeachment of then-Ombudsman
Merceditas Gutierrez;
5.
Wanton
arbitrariness and partiality in consistently
disregarding the principle of res
judicata, or resurrecting decided cases, and in deciding in favor of gerrymandering in the cases involving the 16
newly created cities, and the promotion of Dinagat Island into a province;
6.
Arrogating unto himself, and to a committee he created, the authority and jurisdiction to
improperly [sic] investigate an
alleged erring member of the Supreme Court for the purpose of exculpating
him. Such authority and jurisdiction are properly reposed by the Constitution
in the House of Representatives via impeachment.
7.
Partiality in granting a temporary
restraining order in favor of Arroyo and her husband Jose Miguel Arroyo in order to give them an opportunity
to escape prosecution and to frustrate the ends of justice, and in distorting the Supreme Court decision on
the effectivity of the TRO in view of a clear failure to comply with the
conditions of the Supreme Court’s own TRO.
8.
Failure and refusal to account for the Judiciary Development Fund
and Special Allowance for the Judiciary collections.
Last Tuesday, December 13, 2011, the Senate
received the Articles of Impeachment from the Lower House. And the other day,
December 14, 2011, the 23 Senators (the 24th slot was vacated with
the assumption to the presidency of then-Senator Benigno Aquino III) formally took
their oath as members of the impeachment court. They also unanimously adopted a
resolution directing CJ Corona to answer the charges filed against him
and to face the trial at the proper time. The Senate has however
adjourned for the Christmas break and will be back on January 16, 2012.
Meanwhile, the Chief Justice was in
fighting form. Emboldened by what he referred to as unexpected show of
support by employees of the judiciary, he lambasted President Aquino for acting
like a dictator. He also rejected calls for his resignation. But he expressed willingness
go through the impeachment process and fight for the whole judiciary, which he
claimed to be also the object of the attacks of his enemies.
The
Erap impeachment experience revisited
The Filipino nation has already experienced a highly-charged impeachment drama when former President Joseph “Erap” Estrada
was impeached by the Lower House and was thereafter tried by the Senate of the
11th Congress. With the immensity of the stakes involved at that
time, Philippine television networks pre-empted their regular programming and
broadcast the trial live. For many a layperson, myself included, it was the
first time that we got a glimpse of the intricate world of the legal profession, became fascinated wit the tit-for-tat of opposing counsels, and strained to learn lawyer-speak (Anyone remembers “gobbledygook”?).
We had a first-hand view of a real-life telenovela unfolding before our eyes in real-time. At times, things turned comedic, circus-like even, providing us with light moments. Retired Justice Isagani
Cruz thus characterized those moments of the Senate proceedings as “a
fashion show among the senators, a continuous flow of
grammatical lapses and mispronunciations, legal skulduggery at its worst, many
displays of unabashed grandstanding, and, finally, as the climax of the farce,
a revolting revelation of the depths to which some senators could sink for the
most damnable of motives.”[2]
It would have been interesting had the trial
been concluded and came to a vote. It was of course widely expected that Erap
would be acquitted since the 2/3 vote of all senators-judges, which is
necessary to convict in an impeachment trial, appeared insurmountable at that
time. But we were deprived of that opportunity when majority of the
senators-judges (called “Craven Eleven” by the colourful Justice Cruz) refused
to open the second envelop on the ground that its contents were not relevant to
the trial. It was widely thought at that time that the envelope contained
damning evidence against Erap. But this was later proved false – only that the damage had been done and Erap
was already gone.
The negative vote on the opening of second
envelop, coupled with the arrogant front showed by the “Craven Eleven” in the
immediate aftermath of the vote (Who would forget Tessie Aquino-Oreta, caught
on camera gettin’ jiggy wit’ it?) proved
to be the undoing of Erap’s allies in the Senate. It was the fuse that triggered
the free-fall of their boss. The House prosecuting team walked out in purported
disgust. The opposition operators, like seasoned generals too well-versed in
the art of war to miss an opportunity to quickly subdue an opponent, correctly
read that their chances lie in invoking people power and bringing the battle to
the streets. With the mob-frenzy stoked into spontaneous combustion, Erap stood
no chance. He finally had to go. (Read: “resigned” according to the Supreme
Court.)
Ironically for CJ Corona, as
then-Vice-President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s chief of staff, he was one of
Mrs. Arroyo’s most trusted lieutenants in the anti-climactic negotiations with
Erap’s people during the height of EDSA 2. Now, he is facing the same
predicament that once confronted Erap. As they say, ang
buhay ay weather, weather lang.
Constitutional
basis of impeachment
According to Sec. 1, Art. XI of the 1987
Constitution, “[p]ublic office is a
public trust. Public officers
and employees must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve them with
utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism
and justice, and lead modest lives.” This sums up the legal foundation
of the article on the accountability of public officers. Thus, public officers
who are found to have breached the trust reposed in them by the people may be
removed from office whenever warranted under the laws and the rules.
Generally, removal from office is the
ultimate penalty that may be imposed on a public officer found guilty in an
appropriate administrative proceeding. But there are public officers who may
only be removed from office by a special process: after conviction in an
impeachment trial. According to Sec. 2 of Art. XI, these so-called impeachable
officers are (1) the President; (2) the Vice-President; (3) the Members of
the Supreme Court; (4) the Members of the Constitutional Commissions (i.e., the
Comelec, the Civil Service Commission, and the Commission on Audit); and (5) the Ombudsman (but
not his deputies).
“The power of impeachment,” according to Justice Sereno, “is the Legislature’s check against the
abuses of the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court,
the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman. Having been
elected or appointed for fixed terms, these impeachable officers enjoy security
of tenure, which is intended to enhance their capability to perform their
governmental functions efficiently and independently. However, their tenure, arising
from either direct election by the people or indirect appointment by the
people’s representatives, is not carte
blanche authority for them to abuse their powers. In the face of
gross governmental abuse, the people have not been made so powerless by the
Constitution as to suffer until the impeachable officer’s term or appointment
expires. The Legislature’s impeachment power is the very solution provided by
the fundamental law to remove, in the interim, public officers who have failed
to uphold the public’s trust.”[3]
Nature of
impeachment
Impeachment has repeatedly been characterized as a
“political process.” True, there is that. But there is also more.
Justice (later Chief Justice) Puno once averred that “[t]here is now a commixture of
political and judicial components in our reengineered concept of
impeachment. It is for this reason and more that impeachment
proceedings are classified as sui
generis [or a class of its own]. To be sure, our impeachment
proceedings are indigenous, a kind of its own. They have been shaped
by our distinct political experience especially in the last fifty
years. EDSA People Power I resulted in the radical rearrangement of
the powers of government in the 1987 Constitution.”[4] But notwithstanding its sui generis nature, impeachment as a
legal concept is “not supra legem (beyond
the law)”,[5]
meaning it is still subject to limitations prescribed in the Constitution.
A more comprehensive description of the nature of
an impeachment proceeding came from Justice Vitug,[6] who described it as follows:
As
a proceeding, impeachment might be so described thusly – First, it is legal and political in nature and, second, it is sui generis neither a criminal or administrative
proceeding, but partaking a hybrid
characteristic of both and retaining the requirement of due
process basic to all
proceedings. Its political nature is apparent from its function as being a
constitutional measure designed to protect the State from official
delinquencies and malfeasance, the punishment of the offender being merely
incidental. Although impeachment is intended to be non-partisan, the power to
impeach is nevertheless lodged in the House of Representatives, whose members
are highly responsive to political and partisan influences. The trial by the Senate is thought to
reduce the likelihood of an impeachment case being decided solely along
political lines. With its
character of being part
criminal and part administrative, carrying the punitive sanction not only
of removal and disqualification from office but likewise the stigmatization of
the offender, an impeachment proceeding does not exactly do away with basic
evidentiary rules and rudimentary due process requirements of notice and
hearing. [Emphasis in the original.]
Grounds for impeachment in the
Constitution
The
grounds for impeachment as enumerated in Sec. 2, Art. XI of the 1987
Constitution are: (1) culpable violation of the Constitution; (2) treason; (3) bribery; (4)
graft and corruption; (5) other high crimes; and (6) betrayal of public trust.
The alleged impeachable
offenses of CJ Corona
As stated at the outset, CJ Corona is accused of graft and corruption, culpable
violation of the Constitution, and betrayal
of public trust.
According to Cruz,[7] “[g]raft and corruption”
is “to be understood in the light of
the prohibited acts enumerated in the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act...” while
“[c]ulpable violation of the Constitution” is “wrongful, intentional, and willful disregard or flouting of the
fundamental law.” Meanwhile, the deliberations[8] of framers of the 1987 Constitution indicate that “betrayal
of public trust” is meant to be a catchall phrase that includes “all acts which are not punishable by
statutes as penal offenses but, nonetheless, render the officer unfit to
continue in office. It includes betrayal of public interest, inexcusable
negligence of duty, tyrannical abuse of power, breach of official duty by
malfeasance or misfeasance, cronyism, favoritism, etc. to the prejudice of
public interest and which tend to bring the office into disrepute.” It also
includes “obstruction of justice”[9]
and violations of human rights.”[10]
The question now is, do the acts and
omissions enumerated in the eight Articles of Impeachment sufficiently
constitute the impeachable offenses alleged to have been committed by the Chief
Justice?
Opinions
have been ventured on this query, both in the affirmative and in the negative. The
rule is of course well-established: the determination of what constitutes an
impeachable offense is a political question; it is beyond judicial review. This
is because “[f]ull
discretion is vested in Congress, both the House and the Senate, to determine
whether or not an officer should be impeached, subject only to constitutionally
provided limits. Even if the expanded certiorari jurisdiction allows the Court
to review legislative acts that contravene the express provisions of the
Constitution, the Court cannot
supplant with its own determination, that of Congress in finding whether a
public officer has performed acts that are grounds for impeachment. The
political character of the process is underscored by a degree of imprecision in
the offenses subject of impeachment, thus allowing Congress sufficient
leeway to describe the acts as impeachable or not.”[11]
The “undue haste”
argument
With
the undue haste[12] that characterized the
preparation and the filing of the impeachment complaint against CJ Corona, the would-be
prosecutors are lucky enough that Congress has adjourned for the holidays. This
helps them buy time to prepare their case, streamline their arguments and
formulate their strategy, and gather the necessary evidence.
Speaking
of the House blitzkrieg, what will happen if some people with enough resources
and plenty of time to spare will file a test case before the Supreme Court, perhaps an original civil action for
certiorari and prohibition, assailing the “undue
haste” of the House as “grave abuse of discretion”?
The “undue haste” argument, in
itself, has been proven ineffective in De Castro vs. Committee on Justice.[13] In
that case, the petitioners, who were Members of
the Batasang Pambansa, alleged that the Committee on Justice deliberated on the
sufficiency in form and substance of the impeachment complaint filed against then-President
Marcos for only several hours. The
Committee then dismissed the impeachment complaint on the same day the
complaint was filed, prompting the petitioners to file a case before the
Supreme Court to annul the resolution dismissing the impeachment complaint and
to compel the respondent Committee to give due course to the impeachment
complaint. The petitioners contended that the Committee had acted with undue
haste in unceremoniously dismissing the impeachment complaint. The Court
denied due course and held –
xxx.
There is no allegation in the petition for certiorari that in the exercise of
its powers the Batasan had violated any provision of the Constitution. The fact
that the Committee on Justice dismissed the petition on the same day it was filed
after deliberating on it for several hours as reported in the newspapers, radio
and television (which must have been the basis of petitioners’ claim that the
Committee had acted with undue haste in unceremoniously dismissing the
complaint for impeachment) does not provide basis for concluding that there had
been a violation of any provision of the Constitution which would justify the
Court’s intervention to ensure proper observance of constitutional norms and
conduct. xxx.
Apparently, had the petitioners in De Castro alleged a specific violation of the Constitution
together with the “undue haste” argument, the petition would have at least been
given due course and the Court would have decided the case on the merits.
Macalintal’s thesis:
defective complaint due to improper verification
Election lawyer Romulo Macalintal was reported[14] to have stated that the
impeachment complaint against CJ Corona is “defective for lack of proper
verification.” He
pointed out there was “no showing that each of the 188 congressmen who signed
the complaint stated that ‘they read the contents of the complaint and the
allegations are true and correct of their own personal knowledge or based on
authentic records.’”[15]
“This
is the form of ‘verification’ required under the rules of court which applies
to House and Senate rules. A mere ‘jurat’ which states that the complaint was
‘subscribed and sworn to’ is not sufficient verification, making the complaint
an unverified complaint,” he said in a statement.[16]
On first glance, an improper verification might seem just a minor formal defect that could be
easily cured by amendment. But on second thought, this is not that simple, given the number of signatories involved. Moreover, since the Articles of Impeachment has already been filed, the House is not likely to see the need and practicability of amending the verification thereof at this stage. If that be so, then this matter can be played out by creative legal minds, at the very least to delay the impeachment
trial of the Chief Justice in the Senate.
Undue haste +
improper verification argument
How then would the present Court consider a petition that combines the
“undue haste” argument with an allegation that the House violated the Constitution because the impeachment complaint
is not properly verified? That is, a petition whose central premise is that grave abuse of discretion was committed by the Lower House in hastily impeaching CJ Corona and the Senate in
immediately convening as an impeachment court despite – here comes the
innovation from De Castro – the improper
verification of the impeachment complaint?
This is how this can be played out: Somebody files a petition for
certiorari and prohibition before the Supreme Court, impleading the Senate as
an impeachment court and the Lower House as impeachment prosecutors, and praying for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) or a writ of preliminary injunction to
prevent the Senate from further proceeding with the impeachment trial.
In fact, this is not the first time
that an impeachment complaint is assailed for improper verification. In Francisco
vs. House of Representatives,[17]
one of the issues raised by some of the intervenors was the formal defect of the impeachment complaint filed
by more than 1/3 of the House against then-Chief Justice Hilario Davide Jr. In
this case, the second impeachment complaint against CJ Davide was filed by only
two complainants, namely Representatives Gilberto G. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix
William B. Fuentebella. The
rest of the members of the House whose names appear on the attachments thereto
merely signed endorsements to the impeachment complaint.
The majority in Francisco, supra,
refused to rule on the issue of improper verification, arguing that it was not necessary to the determination (i.e., not the very lis mota) of the case. Justice
Ynares-Santiago however decided to
squarely address the said issue in the following wise:
Article XI, Section 3 (3) of the
Constitution is explicit:
In case the verified complaint or
resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the
Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment,
and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed. (Emphasis provided.)
The mere endorsement of the members of
the House, albeit embodied in a verified resolution, did not suffice for it did
not constitute filing of the impeachment complaint, as this term is plainly
understood. In order that
the verified complaint may be said to have been filed by at least 1/3 of the
Members, all of them must be named as complainants therein. All of them must sign the main
complaint. This was not
done in the case of the assailed second impeachment complaint against the Chief
Justice. The complaint was
not filed by at least one-third of the Members of the House, and therefore did
not constitute the Article of Impeachment.
I am constrained to disagree with the
majority decision to discard the above issue for being unnecessary for the
determination of the instant cases. On
the contrary, the foregoing defect in the complaint is a vital issue in the
determination of whether or not the House should transmit the complaint to the
Senate, and if it does, whether the Senate should entertain it. The
Constitution is clear that the complaint for impeachment shall constitute the
Articles of Impeachment, without need of referral to the Committee on Justice,
when the complaint is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the
House. Being the exception
to the general procedure outlined in the Constitution, its formal requisites
must be strictly construed. [Emphasis supplied.]
One of the
intervenors in Francisco was Atty. Macalintal. He noticed the
same defect this time in the impeachment complaint filed against CJ Corona. Now, assuming
that between today and the time when the Senate reconvenes in January 2012, what if
some lawyer or individual craving for exposure and attention would file a test case using, among others, the
foregoing premises and reasoning?
And who is to say
that the magistrates who are friendly with CJ Corona would not sustain the above-explained
thesis to justify the issuance of a TRO or an injunction against the Senate?
And who is to say that these same magistrates will not bide their time in
deciding the case on the merits, only to eventually cite the foregoing opinion of Justice Ynares-Santiago to strike down as unconstitutional the Articles of Impeachment now pending against CJ
Corona?
Indeed, these are
interesting times for students of Constitutional Law. But as we wait with bated
breath to see what will happen next, we hope that this exercise will not destroy
our democratic institutions and result in a constitutional crisis. We hope instead that this will enrich our collective experience, and will make us mature as a nation.
[3] Sereno, J., concurring (and dissenting)
opinion in the case of Gutierrez vs. Committee on Justice, G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011.
[4] Puno, J., concurring and
dissenting in Francisco vs. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003.
[5] Tinga, J., separate (concurring) opinion in Francisco, supra.
[6] Vitug, J., separate (concurring) opinion in Francisco, supra.
[7] Isagani A. Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 2002 Edition, pp. 358-359.
[8] 2 Record of the Constitutional Proceedings and Debates, 272, cited in
the Concurring Opinion of Carpio, J. in
Gutierrez
vs. Committee on Justice, G.R. No. 193459, February
15, 2011.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Sereno, J., concurring (and
dissenting) in Gutierrez vs. Committee on Justice, G.R.
No. 193459, February 15, 2011. Underscoring and emphasis
supplied.
[12] President Aquino’s pit
bull in the House, Congressman
[13] G.R. No.
L-71688, September 3, 1985.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid.
[17] G.R. No.
160261, November 10, 2003.
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