Addendum to the Random Thoughts on the Impeachment of CJ Corona

There is an aspect of the due process requirement vis-a-vis the impeachment of Chief Justice Renato Corona that is apparently lost amidst the noise – drowned for now by the tragedy wrought by Tropical Storm Sendong.

Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of Sec. 3, Article XI of the Constitution provides:

(2)    A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution or endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.

(3)      A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.

(4)      In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed. [Underscoring and emphasis mine. –Atty. Ed.]

The foregoing provisions indicate two things:

(1)      Where the impeachment complaint is filed by a Member of the House or by a citizen, paragraphs 2 and 3 suggest – and this is invariably confirmed by the rules of impeachment promulgated by the House under the 1987 Constitution, the latest of which is the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (“House Impeachment Rules”) promulgated by the 15^th Congress – that the respondent officer is given the opportunity to be heard. Under Sec. 4 of the House Impeachment Rules, the Committee on Justice shall initially determine the sufficiency in form and substance of the impeachment complaint. If both are in the affirmative, the respondent officer is then notified and required to answer to the complaint.  Thus, even if an officer may eventually be impeached by the House, she had at least the chance to air her side of the controversy before the Committee on Justice.

(2)       Where the impeachment complaint is filed by at least 1/3 of all members of the House under paragraph 4, notice and hearing seems to be dispensed with by the Constitution. This is confirmed by Sec. 13 of the House Impeachment Rules, which provides that “[a] verified complaint/resolution of impeachment filed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and in this case the verified complaint/resolution shall be endorsed to the Senate in the same manner as an approved bill of the House.” Although Sec. 2 of the House Impeachment Rules provide that “[i]mpeachment shall be initiated by the filing and subsequent referral to the Committee on Justice of . . . a verified complaint or resolution of impeachment filed by at least one-third (1/3) of all Members of the House,” this referral merely completes the initiation process. No proceedings are conducted by the Committee on Justice since the complaint/resolution shall then be transmitted forthwith to the Senate.

Notice and hearing under Sec. 4(3) of Art. XI

The idea that notice and hearing are NOT available to the respondent public officer impeached by at least 1/3 of all members of the House is understandable. A plain reading of Sec. 3(4) of Art. XI would suggest that the proceedings before the Committee on Justice and the plenary to determine probable cause are dispensed with. After all, it would apparently be a useless exercise since at least 1/3 of the House already thinks that probable cause does indeed exist.

On the other hand, it can also be argued that such literal reading would result in an incongruous situation. When an officer is impeached under Sec. 3(4), procedural due process, which is otherwise available when the impeachment complaint is filed by a Member of the House or by a citizen under Sec. 3(2), would ostensibly be unavailable. The only conceivable justification for this difference is that in the former, at least 1/3 of the House membership finds probable cause to impeach right from the start; whereas in the latter, at least 1/3 of the House membership finds probable cause to impeach only after the committee recommendation is considered and voted upon by the plenary.

Thus, it can be said that, regardless of the manner of initiating the impeachment proceedings before the House, due process, i.e., notice and opportunity to be heard, must always be observed. This means that even when at least 1/3 of the House is determined to impeach a public officer, the latter must nevertheless be given the opportunity to be heard. This is an idea espoused by Justice Panganiban, in his Separate Concurring Opinion in Francisco vs. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003.

The Francisco ruling revisited

To put the Panganiban thesis in context, we briefly revisit the Francisco ruling.

On June 2, 2003, ousted President Joseph Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide and Associate Justices Artemio V. Panganiban, Josue N. Bellosillo, Reynato S. Puno, Antonio T. Carpio, Renato C. Corona, Jose C. Vitug, and Leonardo A. Quisumbing. The complaint was however dismissed on October 22, 2003 for insufficiency in substance.

On the following day, a second impeachment complaint was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (1^st District, Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella (3^rd District, Camarines Sur), this time against the Chief Justice alone. The complaint was founded on the purported results of the legislative inquiry on the alleged misuse of the Judiciary Development Fund by the Chief Justice.

The pivotal issue in Francisco was whether the second impeachment complaint was barred under Sec. 3(5) of the Constitution, which provides that “[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.”

The Court held that “initiation” takes place by the act of filing the impeachment complaint and its referral to the House Committee on Justice. Thus, filing of the of the second impeachment complaint by more than 1/3 of the House membership violated the one-year bar rule under Sec. 3(5) of Article XI since President Estrada already previously initiated another impeachment case within the one-year period. Justice Carpio-Morales summed up her ponencia thus:

In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.

The Panganiban thesis: lack of due process renders an impeachment unconstitutional

As mentioned above, Justice Panganiban separately concurred in the Francisco decision. On the matter of the observance of due process during the initiation of the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide by more than 1/3 of the entire House membership, he noted:

[D]uring the Oral Argument, Senator Salonga and Petitioner Francisco Chavez denounced the second Impeachment Complaint as violative of due process.  They argued that by virtue merely of the endorsement of more than one third of the members of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice was immediately impeached without being afforded the twin requirements of notice and hearing.  The proceedings were therefore null and void ab initio.  I must agree.

The due process clause, enshrined in our fundamental law, is a conditio sine qua non that cannot be ignored in any proceeding -- administrative, judicial or otherwise. It is deemed written into every law, rule or contract, even though not expressly stated therein.  Hence, the House rules on impeachment, insofar as they do not provide the charged official with (1) notice and (2) opportunity to be heard prior to being impeached [after at least one-third of all the Members of the House filed the impeachment complaint], are also unconstitutional. [Emphasis mine. –Atty. Ed.]

The issue on whether due process was observed was not the lis mota of the controversy in Francisco; thus, the majority of the Court did not find it necessary to rule upon it. But the lack of due process may very well be raised as the pivotal issue in a petition filed to question the impeachment of CJ Corona. In the case of CJ Corona, as in Francisco, the impeachment complaint is filed by more than 1/3 of the entire House membership. But unlike Francisco, in the case of the Chief Justice, the House not only hastily filed the impeachment complaint; it also immediately transmitted the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate, triggering the commencement of the proceedings before the Senate.

Thus, the action of the House of Representatives in NOT giving CJ Corona notice and opportunity to be heard prior to actually impeaching the latter and transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate is vulnerable to being assailed as unconstitutional for violating the due process clause.

How to play out the “unconstitutional for lack of due process” argument

This is how it is going to be played out: a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition will be filed questioning the constitutionality of the impeachment of the Chief Justice (and seeking the injunction of the Senate from continuing with its proceedings as an impeachment court). It shall be anchored on the proposition that the House committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in hastily impeaching the Chief Justice and transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate. It will be argued, using the Panganiban thesis, that CJ Corona was not given notice and opportunity to be heard by the House; thus, the whole impeachment proceeding is void from the start.

As of this writing, three petitions have already been filed before the High Tribunal assailing the validity of the Chief Justice’s impeachment.  I have not read the contents of the said petitions so I have no idea how the petitioners laid down their arguments. One thing is certain though: With the majority of the Supreme Court magistrates cozying with CJ Corona in landmark decisions, especially those involving the previous dispensation, it is not farfetched to think that a petition assailing the Chief Magistrate’s impeachment, when loaded with reasonably sufficient ammunition such as the “unconstitutional for lack of due process” argument, would most likely succeed. I have a nagging feeling that, for better or worse, our jurisprudence on impeachment will be enriched soon.